Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Remembrance of Things Past' and 'Varieties of Causation'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that nothing else could have been the unique entity composed of certain parts except the very thing that is composed of those parts.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 2)
     A reaction: This sounds initially implausible. It means the ship of Theseus ceases to be that ship if you change a single nail of it. Whether we say that seems optional, but if we do, it leads to the collaps of all our normal understanding of identity.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
When we need to do something, we depute an inner servant to remind us of it [Proust]
     Full Idea: Whenever we have something definite to do at a given moment, we depute a certain person inside us who is accustomed to that sort of duty to keep an eye on the clock and warn us of the time. This inner servant reminded me that Albertine was coming soon.
     From: Marcel Proust (Remembrance of Things Past [1922], Cities.2.1)
     A reaction: I think Proust is wrong that we 'depute' this servant. I think it comes as a built-in feature, and the servant could never be abandoned or sacked, no matter how poor the service. Each of us is a team, which includes servants.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If I fasten a board onto a tree stump, causing a table to come into existence, ...what law of nature or, even, what quasi-law or law-like principle could possibly play in such a case of generation the role required by nomological accounts?
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 1)
     A reaction: A very nice question. The nomological account is at its strongest when rocks fall off walls or magnets attract, but all sorts of other caused events seem too messy or complex or original to fit the story.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
     Full Idea: The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator. If p-and-q is a fact, then this necessitates that p, but the fact that p need not be a result or consequence of the fact that p-and-q.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], p.242)
     A reaction: This is obviously correct, and needs to be borne in mind when considering necessary causation. It is not enough to produce a piece of logic; something in the link from cause to effect must be demonstrated to be necessary.
Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]
     Full Idea: It is not clear how to analyse the form of necessary causation found in the only three people in the room being tall causing everybody in the room to be tall.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 5)
     A reaction: I would want to challenge this as a case of causation. There are no events or processes involved. It seems that a situation described in one way can also be described in another.