Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Mengzi (Mencius)' and 'Epistemology Naturalized'

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19 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
     Full Idea: Mathematics reduces only to set theory, and not to logic proper… but set theory cannot claim the same firmness and obviousness as logic.
     From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.69-70)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
     Full Idea: There is something seriously misguided about Quine's project of reducing epistemology to psychology, since psychology, like any of the natural sciences, presupposes an epistemology.
     From: comment on Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
     A reaction: I wonder if epistemology presupposes psychology? Belief, for example, is a category of folk psychology, which could be challenged. There is a quiet battle going on between philosophy and science.
We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
     Full Idea: Quine is suggesting that philosophy should abandon the attempt to provide a foundation for knowledge, or otherwise justify it, and should instead give an account of how knowledge is acquired.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Donald Davidson - Epistemology Externalized p.193
     A reaction: If you are going to explain how 'knowledge' is acquired, you'd better know what knowledge is. My suspicion is that Quine would be quite happy (in the pragmatist tradition) to just focus on belief, and forget about knowledge entirely.
If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
     Full Idea: Quine asks us to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered epistemology, ..and repudiate normativity. ..But then knowledge itself drops out of epistemology, for our concept of knowledge is inseparably tied to that of justification.
     From: comment on Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - What is 'naturalized epistemology'? p.305
     A reaction: Presumably this would not bother Quine, who wants to hand so-called 'epistemology' over to the psychologists. A psychological account of belief seems plausible. Presumably false beliefs could only be pragmatically characterised.
Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
     Full Idea: If normativity is wholly excluded from naturalized epistemology it cannot even be thought of as being about beliefs.
     From: comment on Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - What is 'naturalized epistemology'? p.306
     A reaction: And if it doesn't refer to beliefs, it certainly doesn't refer to knowledge. One might try to subsume normativity under evolutionary pragmatic 'drives', or something. Quine's project would then become wildly speculative, and hence boring.
Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
     Full Idea: Epistemology falls into place as a chapter of psychology, and hence of natural science. ..We study meagre input and torrential output, to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence.
     From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.83)
     A reaction: It depends what you are interested in. If you just want to know what makes humans tick, then Quine is your man, but if you want to know things in general, and want to know how to get it right, then the normative side of epistemology is unavoidable.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
     Full Idea: All inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.
     From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.75)
     A reaction: This betrays Quine's behaviourist tendencies, and rules out introspection, definitions and inferences. Quine's conclusion is fairly total scepticism about meaning, but that is not surprising, given his external and meaningless starting point.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the controversial notion of analyticity can be dispensed with, in our definition of observation sentences, in favour of the straightforward attitude of community-wide acceptance.
     From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.86)
     A reaction: That might be a reasonable account of 'bachelors'. If the whole community accepts 'God exists', does that make it analytic? If a whole (small!) community claims to actually observe a ghost or a flying saucer, is that then analytic?
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the King likes music then there is hope for the state [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: If the King has a great fondness for music, then perhaps there is hope for the state of Ch'i.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be Shakespeare's attitude to music as well. The general idea must be that love of music requires a selfless state of mind, where the mind revels in the beauty of something outside of itself. Respect is the desirable result.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human nature is naturally compassionate and good (as a 'sprout'), but people may not be good [Mengzi (Mencius), by Norden]
     Full Idea: Mengzi does not claim that humans are innately good; he claims that human nature is innately good. …He says that 'the heart of compassion' (manifested when anyone sees a child about to fall into a well) is the 'sprout of benevolence'.
     From: report of Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.II
     A reaction: There is a nice distinction here between the 'sprout' of human nature and the finished product. Seeds have the potential to produce tall healthy plants, but circumstances can warp them.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Righteousness is extending the unthinkable, to reveal what must be done [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: People all have things they will not do. To extend this reaction to that which they will do is righteousness.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 7B31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.IV
     A reaction: Very nice! Kekes points out the enormous importance of unthinkable deeds. Depravity is when the unthinkable gradually begins to look possible, which is probably a social phenomenon, a creeping cancer in a culture.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Each correct feeling relies on an underlying virtue [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: The heart of compassion is benevolence. The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 6A6), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.III
     A reaction: 'Disdain' seems to be the response to anyone who is disrespectful. Note that wisdom concerns judgements. Respect seems to be more of a social convention than an actual concern for others.
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Should a coward who ran fifty paces from a battle laugh at another who ran a hundred? [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: If two soldiers were fleeing from a battle, and one stopped after a hundred paces and the other stopped after a fifty paces, what would you think if the latter, as one who only ran fifty paces, were to laugh at the former who ran a hundred?
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.3)
     A reaction: A nice illustration, in my view, of the universality of truths about human virtue. In no culture would this laughter be appropriate. Nevertheless, there must be degrees of dishonour. Better to flee than join in with the likely winners.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A true king shares his pleasure with the people [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: If you shared your enjoyment of music or of hunting with the people, you would be a true King.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1)
     A reaction: I suspect that this is a great truth for dictators and traditional monarchs. One pictures the successful ones attending public entertainments, and allowing the public to see their own. Tyrants keep entertainment private. Nero is a counterexample!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Extend the treatment of the old and young in your family to the rest of society [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families. Treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age, and extend this to the young of other families.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7)
     A reaction: This seems to me to articulate the ideal of communitarianism very nicely. Morality is not just about healthy adults in war and peace. It must include the children and the old. The values of the family are above the values of contracts and calculations.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Only put someone to death if the whole population believes it is deserved [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: When close attendants say a man deserves death, do not listen; when all the councillors say so, do not listen; when everyone says so, have the case investigated. If he is guilty, put him to death; he was put to death by the whole country.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.7)
     A reaction: The jury system is a gesture in this direction. Compare Idea 95. In Mencius's time, no doubt, everyone believed that capital punishment was sometimes right. Nowadays, when many people (e.g. me) reject it, the procedure won't work.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Seeking peace through war is like looking for fish up a tree [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: Your desire to extend your territory by war, in order to bring peace, is like looking for fish by climbing a tree.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7)
     A reaction: Mencius had a flair for analogies. Just occasionally I suppose he might be wrong on this point, but I would think that experiments in the laboratory of history have shown that he is right in nearly all cases.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Avoid the animals you are going to eat, as it is hard once you have got to know them [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: Once a gentleman has seen animals alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh. That is why the gentleman keeps his distance from the kitchen.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7)
     A reaction: If you applied this to a Gestapo officer and his victims, it would obviously be the epitome of wickedness. But it is complex. Compassion is expected when we encounter suffering, but we are not obliged to seek out suffering. Or are we?