9 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129) | |
A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist? |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270) | |
A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition. |
9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Why should we accept that necessities can only be known a priori? Prima facie, some necessities are known empirically; for example, that water is necessarily H2O, and that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus. | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2) | |
A reaction: An important question, whatever your view. If the only thing we can know a priori is necessities, it doesn't follow that necessities can only be known a priori. It gets interesting if we say that some necessities can never be known a priori. |
9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
Full Idea: We have no need to turn to an a priori explanation of our knowledge of mathematics and logic. Our intuitions that this knowledge is not justified in some direct empirical way is preserved. It is justified in an indirect holistic way. | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2) | |
A reaction: I think this is roughly the right story, but the only way it will work is if we have some sort of theory of abstraction, which gets us up the ladder of generalisations to the ones which, it appears, are necessarily true. |
9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of the a priori is too obscure for it to feature in a good explanation of our knowledge of anything. | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §3) | |
A reaction: I never like this style of argument. It would be nice if all the components of all our our explanations were crystal clear. Total clarity about anything is probably a hopeless dream, and we may have to settle for murky corners in all explanations. |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042) | |
A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible. |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062) | |
A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness. |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058) | |
A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen? |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |