53 ideas
17016 | Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton] |
Full Idea: In philosophy abstraction from the senses is required. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: He particularly means 'natural philosophy' (i.e. science), but there is no real distinction in Newton's time, and I would say this remark is true of modern philosophy. |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
Full Idea: I once wrote that there are three linguistic devices that make it possible for us to frame undecidable statements: quantification over infinity totalities, as expressed by word such as 'never'; the subjunctive conditional form; and the past tense. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: Dummett now repudiates the third one. Statements containing vague concepts also appear to be undecidable. Personally I have no problems with deciding (to a fair extent) about 'never x', and 'if x were true', and 'it was x'. |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
Full Idea: There is surely no number n such that "n grains of sand do not make a heap, although n+1 grains of sand do" is true. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: It might be argued that there is such a number, but no human being is capable of determing it. Might God know the value of n? On the whole Dummett's view seems the most plausible. |
18079 | Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher] |
Full Idea: The reduction of the problems of tangents, normals, curvature, maxima and minima were effected by Newton's kinematic approach to geometry. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.1 | |
A reaction: This approach apparently contrasts with that of Leibniz. |
18082 | Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton] |
Full Idea: Quantities and the ratios of quantities, which in any finite time converge continually to equality, and, before the end of that time approach nearer to one another by any given difference become ultimately equal. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Lemma 1), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.2 | |
A reaction: Kitcher observes that, although Newton relies on infinitesimals, this quotation expresses something close to the later idea of a 'limit'. |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist account of the meaning of mathematical statements does not employ the notion of a statement's being true, but only that of something's being a proof of the statement. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: I remain unconvinced that anyone could give an account of proof that didn't discreetly employ the notion of truth. What are we to make of "we suspect this is true, but no one knows how to prove it?" (e.g. Goldbach's Conjecture). |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea of 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east'. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: The phrase was coined in Oxford. It is a useful label with which realists can insult solipsists, idealists and other riff-raff. Four Dimensionalists seem to see time in this way. Events sit there, and we travel past them. But there are indexical events. |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In distinguishing between what can establish a statement about the past as true and what it is that that statement says, we are repudiating antirealism about the past. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a late shift of ground from the champion of antirealism. If Dummett's whole position is based on a 'justificationist' theory of meaning, he must surely have a different theory of meaning now for statements about the past? |
17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
Full Idea: Many things lead me to a suspicion that all phenomena may depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, either are impelled toward one another and cohere in regular figures,or are repelled from one another and recede. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Pref) | |
A reaction: For Newton, forces are not just abstractions that are convenient for mathematics, but realities which I would say are best described as 'powers'. |
17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
Full Idea: The particles of bodies attract one another at very small distances and cohere when they become contiguous. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of account of unity which has to be given in the corpuscular view of things, once substantial forms are given up. What is missing here is the structure of the thing. A lump of dirt is as unified as a cat in this story. |
17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
Full Idea: The place of a whole is the same as the sum of the places of the parts, and is therefore internal and in the whole body. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: Note that Newton is talking of the sums of places, and deriving them from the parts. This is the mereology of space. |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The existence of a universe from which sentience was permanently absent is an unintelligible fantasy. What exists is what can be known to exist. What is true is what can be known to be true. Reality is what can be experienced and known. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as nonsense. The fact that we cannot think about a universe without introducing a viewpoint does not mean that we cannot 'intellectually imagine' its existence devoid of viewpoints. Nothing could ever experience a star's interior. |
17546 | If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton] |
Full Idea: The connection between the different concept in [Newton's] system is so close that one could generally not change any one of the concepts without destroying the whole system | |
From: comment on Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 06 | |
A reaction: This holistic situation would seem to count against Newton's system, rather than for it. A good system should depend on nature, not on other parts of the system. Compare changing a rule of chess. |
17027 | Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton] |
Full Idea: In experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) | |
A reaction: Sounds easy, but generalising by induction requires all sorts of assumptions about the stability of natural kinds. Since the kinds are only arrived at by induction, it is not easy to give a proper account here. |
17022 | We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton] |
Full Idea: No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain the phenomena. …For nature does nothing in vain, …and nature is simple and does not indulge in the luxury of superfluous causes. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Rule 1) | |
A reaction: This emphasises that Ockham's Razor is a rule for physical explanation, and not just one for abstract theories. This is something like Van Fraassen's 'empirical adequacy'. |
17021 | Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton] |
Full Idea: The causes assigned to natural effects of the same kind must be, so far as possible, the same. For example, the cause of respiration in man and beast. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Rule 2) | |
A reaction: It is impossible to rule out identical effects from differing causes, but explanation gets much more exciting (because wide-ranging) if Newton's rule is assumed. |
17026 | From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton] |
Full Idea: I have not as yet been able to deduce from the phenomena the reason for the properties of gravity. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) | |
A reaction: I take it that giving the reasons for the properties of gravity would be an essentialist explanation. I am struck by the fact that the recent discovery of the Higgs Boson appears to give us a reason why things have mass (i.e. what causes mass). |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Verification is not an individual but a collective activity. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This generates problems. Are deceased members of the community included? (Yes, says Dummett). If someone speaks to angels (Blake!), do they get included? Is a majority necessary? What of weird loners? Etc. |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To demonstrate the necessity of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, a proponent of such a theory must argue that use cannot be described without appeal to the conditions for the truth of statements. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Unlike Dummett, I find that argument rather appealing. How do you decide the possible or appropriate use for a piece of language, if you don't already know what it means. Basing it all on social conventions means it could be meaningless ritual. |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: It is not enough for the truth-condition theorist to argue that we need the concept of truth: he must show that we should have the same conception of truth that he has. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson invites us to accept Tarski's account of truth. It invites the question of what the theory would be like with a very robust correspondence account of truth, or a flabby rather subjective coherence view, or the worst sort of pragmatic view. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
6421 | Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell] |
Full Idea: Newton works with four fundamental concepts: space, time, matter and force. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Bertrand Russell - My Philosophical Development Ch.2 | |
A reaction: The ontological challenge is to reduce these in number, presumably. They are, notoriously, defined in terms of one another. |
13470 | Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: For Newton, mass is central to matter. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: On reading this, I realise that this is the concept of matter I have grown up with, one which makes it very hard to grasp what the Greeks were thinking of when they referred to matter [hule]. |
17020 | An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton] |
Full Idea: The attractions of the bodies must be reckoned by assigning proper forces to their individual particles and then taking the sums of those forces. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], 1.II.Schol) | |
A reaction: This is using the parts of bodies to give fundamental explanations, rather than invoking substantial forms. The parts need not be atoms. |
23012 | Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: In the Newtonian mechanistic theory of causation, ….something causes a result when it brings about a change of motion. …Causation is a matter of things bumping into one another. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Baron,S/Miller,K - Intro to the Philosophy of Time 6.2.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to need impenetrability and elasticity as primitives (which is partly what Leibniz's monads are meant to explain). The authors observe that much causation is the result of existences and qualities, rather than motions. |
17008 | You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: You have made the astonishing discovery that Kepler's ellipses result simply from the conception of attraction or gravitation and passage in a planet. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Gottfried Leibniz - Letter to Newton 1693.03.07 | |
A reaction: I quote this to show that Newton made 'an astonishing discovery' of a connection in nature, and did not merely produce an equation which described a pattern of behaviour. The simple equation is the proof of the connection. |
17010 | We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton] |
Full Idea: The moderns - rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities - have undertaken to reduce the phenomena of nature to mathematical laws. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Preface) | |
A reaction: This is the simplest statement of the apparent anti-Aristotelian revolution in the seventeenth century. |
17023 | I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton] |
Full Idea: I am by no means asserting that gravity is essential to bodies. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Rule 3) | |
A reaction: Notice that in Idea 17009 he does not rule out gravity being essential to bodies. This is Newton's intellectual modesty (for which he is not famous). |
15866 | Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré] |
Full Idea: Following Kepler, Newton assumed a law of universal gravitation, thus reclassifying free fall as a violent motion and, with his First Law, fixing horizontal motion in the absence of constraints as natural | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 1 | |
A reaction: This is in opposition to the Aristotelian view, where the downward motion of physical objects is their natural motion. |
15958 | Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: Newton's principle of inertia implies a rejection of the Aristotelian idea of natural states to which things naturally return. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 02.3 | |
A reaction: I think we can safely say that Aristotle was wrong about this. Aristotle made too much (such as the gravity acting on a thing) intrinsic to the bodies, when the whole context must be seen. |
17017 | 1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton] |
Full Idea: Law 1: Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Axioms) | |
A reaction: This is the new concept of inertia, which revolutionises the picture. Motion itself, which was a profound puzzle for the Greeks, ceases to be a problem by being axiomatised. It is now acceleration which is the the problem. |
20968 | Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum, because 'action and reaction' are always equal. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 | |
A reaction: That is, the Third Law implies the First Law (which is the Law of Momentum). |
17018 | 2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton] |
Full Idea: Law 2: A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and takes place along the straight line in which that force is impressed. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Axioms) | |
A reaction: This gives the equation 'force = mass x acceleration', where the mass is the constant needed for the equation of proportion. Effectively mass is just the value of a proportion. |
17019 | 3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton] |
Full Idea: Law 3: To any action there is always an opposite and equal reaction; in other words, the action of two bodies upon each other are always equal and always opposite in direction. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Axioms) | |
A reaction: Is this still true if one body is dented by the impact and the other one isn't? What counts as a 'body'? |
17547 | Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton] |
Full Idea: Newton introduced a very new and strange hypothesis by assuming a force that acted over a long distance. | |
From: comment on Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 06 | |
A reaction: Why would a force that acted over a short distance be any less mysterious? |
20966 | Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Newton allowed forces other than impact. All the earlier proponents of 'mechanical philosophy' took it as given that all physical action is by contact. ...He thought of 'impressed force' - disembodied entities acting from outside a body. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 | |
A reaction: This is 'action at a distance', which was as bewildering then as quantum theory is now. Newton had a divinity to impose laws of nature from the outside. In some ways we have moved back to the old view, with the actions of bosons and fields. |
20967 | Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Newton has a general law about the effects of his forces, ...but there is no corresponding general principle about the causes of such forces. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that Einstein gives a cause of gravity either. This seems to be part of the scientific 'instrumentalist' view of nature, which is incredibly useful but very superficial. |
16708 | Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton] |
Full Idea: Newton's reliance on the notion of force was widely criticised as marking in effect a return to real qualities. | |
From: comment on Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.7 | |
A reaction: The objection is to forces that are separate from the bodies they act on. This is one of the reasons why modern metaphysics needs the concept of an intrinsic disposition or power, placing the forces in the stuff. |
13153 | I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton] |
Full Idea: I consider in this treatise not the species of forces and their physical qualities, but their quantities and mathematical proportions. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], 1.1.11 Sch) | |
A reaction: Note that Newton is not denying that one might contemplate the species and qualities of forces, as I think Leibniz tried to do, thought he didn't cast any detailed light on them. It is the gap between science and metaphysics. |
12724 | The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton] |
Full Idea: The basic problem of philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Pref 1st ed), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: This fits in with the description-of-regularity approach to laws which Newton had acquired from Galileo, rather than the essentialist attitude to forces of Leibniz, though Newton has smatterings of essentialism. |
13593 | Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis] |
Full Idea: Newton showed that the apparently different kinds of processes of falling towards the earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Brian Ellis - Scientific Essentialism 3.08 | |
A reaction: I quote this to illustrate Newton's permanent achievement in science, in the face of a tendency to say that he was 'outmoded' by the advent of General Relativity. Newton wasn't interestingly wrong. He was very very right. |
20969 | Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: A barrier to the formulation of an energy conservation principle by early Newtonians was their lack of a notion of potential energy. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 3 n5 | |
A reaction: Interestingly, the notions of potentiality and actuality were central to Aristotle, but Newtonians had just rejected all of that. |
17013 | Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton] |
Full Idea: Absolute space, of its own nature without reference to anything external, always remains homogeneous and immovable. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: This would have to be a stipulation, rather than an assertion of fact, since whether space is 'immovable' is either incoherent or unknowable. |
22915 | Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: Both Newton's First and Second Laws of motion make implicit reference to equal intervals of time. For a body is moving with constant velocity if it covers the same distance in a series of equal intervals (and similarly with acceleration). | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 01 'Time' | |
A reaction: [Le Poidevin spells out the acceleration point] You can see why he needs time to be real, if measured chunks of it figure in his laws. |
22893 | Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Newton's reason for embracing absolute space, time and motion was that he thought that universal laws of motions were describable only in such terms. Because actual motions are irregular, the time of universal laws of motion cannot depend on them. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 3 'Replacing' | |
A reaction: I'm not sure of the Einsteinian account of the laws of motion. |
17012 | Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton] |
Full Idea: Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and by another name is called duration. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) | |
A reaction: This invites the notorious question of, if time flows uniformly, how fast time flows. Maybe we should bite the bullet and say 'one second per second', or maybe we should say 'this fact is beyond our powers of comprehension'. |
14012 | Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton] |
Full Idea: Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], I:Schol after defs), quoted by Craig Bourne - A Future for Presentism 5.1 | |
A reaction: I agree totally with this, and I don't care what any modern relativity theorists say. It think Shoemaker's argument gives wonderful support to Newton. |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Maybe both the past and the future are real, determined by our current temporal perspective. Past is then events capable of having a causal influence upon events near us, and future is events we can affect, but from which we receive no information. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This is the Four-Dimensional view, which is opposed to Presentism. Might immediate unease is that it gives encouragement to fortune-tellers, whom I have always dismissed with 'You can't see the future, because it doesn't exist'. |
22954 | Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield] |
Full Idea: In Newton's laws of motion time is squared, so a negative value gives the same result as a positive value, which means Newtonian mechanics cannot distinguish between the two directions of time. | |
From: report of Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687]) by P Coveney / R Highfield - The Arrow of Time 2 'anatomy' | |
A reaction: Maybe Newton just forgot to mention that negative values were excluded. (Or was he unaware of the sequence of negative integers?). Too late now - he's done it. |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea that only the present is real cannot be sustained. St Augustine pointed out that the present has no duration; it is a mere boundary between past and future, and dependent on them. It also denies truth-value to statements about past or future. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: To defend Presentism, I suspect that one must focus entirely on the activities of consciousness and short-term memory. All truths, of past or future, must refer totally to such mental events. But what could an event be if there is no enduring time? |
17015 | If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton] |
Full Idea: It is possible that there is no uniform motion by which time may have an exact measure. All motions can be accelerated and retarded, but the flow of absolute time cannot be changed. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Def 8 Schol) |
17025 | If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton] |
Full Idea: A being, however perfect, without dominion is not the Lord God. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) |
17024 | The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton] |
Full Idea: This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Gen Schol) |