13 ideas
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
Full Idea: Dummett argues that classical logic depends on the choice of the concept of truth as central to the theory of meaning, while for the intuitionist the concept of assertability occupies this position. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 06.5 | |
A reaction: Since I can assert any nonsense I choose, this presumably means 'warranted' assertability, which is tied to the concept of proof in mathematics. You can reason about falsehoods, or about uninterpreted variables. Can you 'assert' 'Fx'? |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Classical quantification represents an infinite conjunction or disjunction, and the truth-value is determined by the infinite sum or product of the instances ....but this presupposes that all the instances already possess determinate truth-values. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.246) | |
A reaction: In the case of the universal quantifier, Dummett is doing no more than citing the classic empiricism objection to induction - that you can't make the universal claim if you don't know all the instances. The claim is still meaningful, though. |
3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
Full Idea: The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely. |
4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Descartes sees passions not as opinions, but as functional devices that the Creator has designed for us to help preserve the body-soul substantial union. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8 | |
A reaction: I wonder what Descartes would have made of the theory of evolution? |
4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
Full Idea: Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire). | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172 | |
A reaction: A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond. |
23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
Full Idea: Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence' | |
A reaction: [not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list. |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
Full Idea: An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of the sentence in other words. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.224) | |
A reaction: Alternatively, if you give something other than a paraphrase of the sentence as its meaning (such as a proof of its truth), then you seem to have departed from your target sentence. Can we reduce and eliminate our sentences in this way? |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If a sentence is effectively undecidable, the condition which must obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a position to do so. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.225) | |
A reaction: The instances of 'undecidable' sentences are most clearly seen in mathematics, such as the Continuum Hypothesis or Goldbach's Conjecture, or anything involving vast infinite cardinals. But do you need precise truth-conditions for meaning? |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If use constitutes meaning, it might seem that use is beyond criticism. ....But such an attitude can, ultimately, be supported onlly by the adoption of a holistic view of language. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.218) | |
A reaction: Dummett goes on to say that the rejection of the holistic view of mathematical meaning leads to his preference for intuitionistic logic. |
20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Our merely willing to walk has the consequence that our legs move and we walk. | |
From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 18), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 1 'Volitionism' | |
A reaction: Stout attributes this to Descartes' dualism, as if legs are separate from persons. Stout says the idea of a prior mental act is not usually now considered as part of an action, or even to exist at all. If the volition is intentional, there is a regress. |
16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
Full Idea: We ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases and the organs that bring about bodily movement decay. | |
From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], I.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: This sounds like a pretty major change in our concept of death, given that we all now agree with Descartes. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8 | |
A reaction: Presumably strength of will can serve evil ends, so this is a bit confusing. |