Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought'' and 'The Sense of Reality'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


3 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The great moments are the death of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Romanticism [Berlin, by Watson]
     Full Idea: Berlin says there were three great turning points: after the death of Aristotle (when Greek schools focused on the inner life of individuals, instead of as social beings), Machiavelli's division of political and individual virtues, and Romanticism.
     From: report of Isaiah Berlin (The Sense of Reality [1996], p.168-9) by Peter Watson - Ideas Intro
     A reaction: I have the impression that Machiavelli introduced a new hard-boiled ethics, which dominated the sixteenth century, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth century they fought back, and Machiavellianism turned out to be just a phase.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The early philosophers thought that reason has its own needs and desires [Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It is part of the notion of reason according to these philosophers [Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics] that reason has its own needs and desires.
     From: Michael Frede (Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' [1996], p.5)
     A reaction: This sounds as if reason is treated as a separate person within a person. Anyone solving a logical puzzle feels that reason has its own compulsion. 'Boulesis' is the desire characteristic of reason.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').