Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Justice: What's the right thing to do?' and 'Locke on Human Understanding'

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27 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel]
     Full Idea: The duty to tell the truth applies only to those who deserve the truth.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05)
     A reaction: [from Benjamin Constant, in opposition to Kant] I prefer the idea that we should use people 'after our own honour and dignity' (Hamlet), which means speaking the truth even to Donald Trump (for those of you who remember 2018). But not always.
Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel]
     Full Idea: A carefully crafted evasion pays homage to truth-telling in a way that an outright lie does not.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05)
     A reaction: Nicely put. He refers to an incident in Kant's life. I think of the great equivocation controversy at the time of the 1605 Gunpowder Plot. See the porter in Macbeth. All I ask is that people care about the truth. Many people don't. Why?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
     A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel]
     Full Idea: The mere fact that you and I make a deal is not enough to make it fair.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06)
Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel]
     Full Idea: Legal thinkers have debated this question for a long time: can consent create an obligation on its own, or is some element of benefit or reliance required?
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06)
     A reaction: Clearly mere consent could be under some compulsion, either by the other party, or by some other forces. Keeping a deathbed promise usually brings no benefit, but is a matter of honour. Ah, honour! Can anyone remember what that is?
Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel]
     Full Idea: Despite a tendency to read consent into moral claims, it is hard to make sense of our morality without acknowledging the independent weight of reciprocity. If my wife is unfaithful I have two different grounds of outrage: our promise, and my loyalty.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06)
     A reaction: The point is that Hobbes and co over-simplify what a contract is. Compare a contract with a promise. One must be two-sided, the other can be one-sided.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel]
     Full Idea: The Golden Rule depends on contingent facts about how people like to be treated. The categorical imperative asks that we abstract from such contingencies and respect persons as rational beings, regardless of what they might want in particular situations.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05)
     A reaction: I think the Golden Rule is wrong for a different reason. It assumes that we all want similar things, which we don't. Focus on other people's needs, not yours.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel]
     Full Idea: Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05)
     A reaction: [Kant lecture note] This is an important qualification to persons as ends. If a person owned themselves, that would separate the person from what they owned. Sandel mentions selling your own organs. Kant is considering prostitution. Why is slavery wrong?
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel]
     Full Idea: It is hard to see how just passing through town is morally akin to ratifying the Constitution.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06)
     A reaction: They say that philosophical ideas are never refuted, and no progress is made, but this sure put paid to John Locke.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel]
     Full Idea: The fact that a constitution is ratified by the people does not prove that its provisions are just.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06)
     A reaction: Yes indeed. And the fact that a majority won a referendum does not make their decision wise. Hence all constitutions must be open to evaluation. Gun laws in the US are the obvious example.
A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel]
     Full Idea: As Kant sees it, a just constitution aims at harmonising each individual's freedom with that of everyone else.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05)
     A reaction: [source?] Nice statement of the project. I increasingly see political philosophy as constitution design. I say philosophers have got fifty years to design an optimum constitution, and they should then down tools and promote it, in simple language.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel]
     Full Idea: Liberal freedom developed as an antidote to political theories that consigned persons to destinies fixed by caste or class, station or rank, custom, tradition or inherited status.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 09)
     A reaction: Virtually all human beings before modern times found that they had been 'assigned destinies'. The huge exception is war, especially civil war, which must be a huge liberation for many people, despite the danger.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel]
     Full Idea: The libertarian view of distributive justice is a free market with formal equality of opportunity. The meritocratic view is a free market with fair equality of opportunity.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06)
     A reaction: The obvious question is what has to be done, by intervention, to make the market fair. There are two major rival views of equality here. Is the starting point fair, and is the race itself fair?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel]
     Full Idea: We have identified three ways of approaching the distribution of goods: welfare, freedom and virtue. ...and these are three ways of thinking about justice.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01)
     A reaction: Virtue is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the problem. The best known instance of justice is punishment, which is a distribution of harms.
Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel]
     Full Idea: To ask whether a society is just is to ask how we distribute the things we prize - income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honours.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01)
     A reaction: There is, of course, the prior question of what things should be controlled by a society for distribution. But there is also justice in the promotional and pay structure of institutions within a society, including private institutions.
Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel]
     Full Idea: Can we ever have a moral responsibility to redress wrongs committed by a previous generation?
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07)
     A reaction: Just asking for a friend. It seems to depend on how close we feel to the previous generation. Regretting the crime committed by a beloved parent is one thing. Despising the crime committed by some right bastard who shares my nationality is another.
Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel]
     Full Idea: Debates about distributive justice are about not only who gets what but also what qualities are worthy of honour and reward.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07)
     A reaction: So the 'undeserving poor' get nuffink? Does just being a human being deserve anything? Obviously yes. That said, we can't deny the concept of 'appropriate reward'.
Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel]
     Full Idea: Justice is not only about the right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 10)
     A reaction: This is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the justice debate - with which I have great sympathy. And, as he argues, the values of things arise out of assessing their essential natures.
Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel]
     Full Idea: For the libertarian free exchange for labour is fair; for Rawls it requires fair background conditions; for Aristotle, for the work to be just it must be suited to the nature of the workers who perform it.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08)
     A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle's idea is powerful, and Sandel performs a great service in drawing attention to it. Imagine the key negotiation in an interview being whether this particular work suits your nature!
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel]
     Full Idea: It is not easy to dispense with teleological reasoning in thinking about social institutions and political practices.
     From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08)
     A reaction: I think teleological thinking is also indispensable in biology. You can't understand an ear or an eye if you don't know what it is FOR. If it relates to a mind, it is teleological. The eye of a dead person is for nothing.