7 ideas
10645 | We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH] |
Full Idea: We have three different ways in which we arrive at concepts or universals: there is a clarification, where we have a ready-made concept and define it; we have a combination (where a definition creates a concept); and an experience can lead to a habit. | |
From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.190) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] He cites Russell as calling the third one a 'condensed induction'. There seems to an intellectualist and non-intellectualist strand in the abstractionist tradition. |
10644 | A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH] |
Full Idea: A 'felt familiarity' with universals seems to be more primitive than explicit abstraction. | |
From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.188) | |
A reaction: This I take to be part of the 'given' of the abstractionist view, which is quite well described in the first instance by Aristotle. Price says that it is 'pre-verbal'. |
10646 | Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH] |
Full Idea: Whether you call it inductive or not, our understanding of such a word as 'dog' or 'house' does arise from a repeated experience of concomitances. | |
From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.191) | |
A reaction: Philosophers don't use phrases like that last one any more. How else could we form the concept of 'dog' - if we are actually allowed to discuss the question of concept-formation, instead of just the logic of concepts. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
4056 | If the soul is held to leave the body at brain-death, it should arrive at the time of brain-creation [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Any Christian who feels that body and soul go their separate ways at brain death ought in consistency to hold that they come together only at the point when whatever is destroyed at brain death first came into being. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (When Does a Life Begin? [1985], p.24) | |
A reaction: Hence Christians probably focus less on brain-death than do doctors and the rest of us. |
4055 | It isn't obviously wicked to destroy a potential human being (e.g. an ununited egg and sperm) [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: A week-old embryo without a brain may be a potential human being, but so are a sperm and an ovum that are about to meet in a dish, and it wouldn't be wicked to keep those apart. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (When Does a Life Begin? [1985], p.19) | |
A reaction: Sounds fine, but it may be a slippery slope. Is it acceptable to deny a place at music school to a potentially great musician? |
4054 | I may exist before I become a person, just as I exist before I become an adult [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: It makes perfectly good sense to say that I existed before I became a person, just as I existed before I became an adult, or a philosopher. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (When Does a Life Begin? [1985], p.13) | |
A reaction: The word 'I' needs thought here. I was once a non-adult, but was I ever a non-person? 'Person' is not a clear concept, despite what many philosophers since Locke may think. |