Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Epistemic Operators'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

6855	Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
	A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument

6856	Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
	A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception

6857	An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
	Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be.
	From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140)
	A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

6445	You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
	Full Idea: The 'Relevant Alternatives' theory of knowledge said the main ingredient that must be added to true belief to make knowledge is that one be in a position to rule out all the relevant alternatives to what one believes.
	From: report of Fred Dretske (Epistemic Operators [1970]) by Keith DeRose - Intro: Responding to Skepticism §6
	A reaction: Dretske and Nozick are associated with this strategy. There will obviously be a problem in defining 'relevant'. Otherwise it sounds quite close to Plato's suggestion that we need true belief with 'logos'.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').