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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault]
     Full Idea: In its critical aspect, philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.300)
     A reaction: A very French view of the subject. It is tempting to say that they had their adolescent outburst in 1789, and it is time to grow up. With rights come responsibilities...
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
     A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault]
     Full Idea: The relationship between philosophy and politics is permanent and fundamental.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.293)
     A reaction: This idea is one of the biggest gulfs between continental and analytical philosophy. Many aspects of philosophy are turning out to be much more social than analytical philosophers might have thought - epistemology, for example.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
     Full Idea: Plutarch says if you have mastered principles then logos will silence your desires like a master silencing a dog - in which case the logos functions without intervention on your part - you have become the logos, or the logos has become you.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.286)
     A reaction: If you believe that logos is pure reason, you might be quite happy with this, but if you thought it was a cultural construct, you might feel that you had been cunningly enslaved. If I ask 'what is 7+6?', logos interrupts me to give the answer.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
     A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140)
     A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault]
     Full Idea: When I talk about power relations and games of truth, I am absolutely not saying that games of truth are just concealed power relations - that would be a horrible exaggeration.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.296)
     A reaction: I take this to be a denial of the more absurd forms of relativism. I think there is an interesting convergence between this kind of continental thinking, and the social view of justification found in the later work of Alvin Goldman.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault]
     Full Idea: The subject is not a substance but a form, which is not always identical to itself. You do not have the same relation to yourself when you go to vote and when you seek to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.290)
     A reaction: I don't think I believe this. If it were true, the concept of 'sexual politics' would mean nothing to me. A brutal or sympathetic nature is likely to express itself in both situations.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault]
     Full Idea: What is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie] practice of freedom?
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.284)
     A reaction: Makes Foucault sound very existentialist. I'm not sure I understand this kind of remark, given that serial killers seem to be exceptionally good at 'practising their freedom'. However, the idea is akin to Kant's notion of a truly good will (Idea 3710).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
     Full Idea: The problem is not to dissolve power relations in a utopia of transparent communications, but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, the morality, the practice of the self, that allows games of power with minimum domination.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.298)
     A reaction: If you are a democrat it is hard to disagree with this, though I am still unclear why being dominated should rank as a total disaster. A healthy personal relationship might involve domination. 'Management techniques' is interesting.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]
     Full Idea: I am somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there is a human nature, that has been concealed or alienated by mechanisms of repression.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.282)
     A reaction: Personally I think there is (to some extent) a human nature, and that it fails to flourish if it gets too much 'liberation. However, the world contains a lot more repression than liberation, so we should all be fans of liberty.