5 ideas
12313 | Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford] |
Full Idea: There are a number of reasons why we explain: out of sheer curiosity, to increase our control of a situation, to help understanding by simplifying or making familiar, to confer meaning or significance, and to give scientific authority to some statement. | |
From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172) |
12314 | Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford] |
Full Idea: Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical. | |
From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172) | |
A reaction: [compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness. |
12315 | We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford] |
Full Idea: The powerful engine of my car can be explained by an examination of each of its parts, but it is not caused by them. They do not cause the engine; they constitute it. | |
From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.174) | |
A reaction: [example from Ruben 1990:221] This could be challenged, since there is clearly a causal connection between the constitution and the whole. We distinguish engine parts which contribute to the power from those which do not. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
8141 | He that does evil has not seen God [John] |
Full Idea: He that doeth evil hath not seen God. | |
From: St John (25: Third Epistle of John [c.90], 11) | |
A reaction: This gives God a role striking similar to Plato's Form of the Good. Plato thought the Good was prior to the gods, but he gives the good a quasi-religious role. I say we would only be inspired by the sight of God if we already had a moral sense. |