Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Explanation: the state of play' and 'Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects''

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
     Full Idea: We have no prior reason to suppose that philosophically significant concepts have interesting analyses into necessary and sufficient conditions.
     From: Timothy Williamson (Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects' [1988])
     A reaction: We might think that they are either analysable or primitive, and that failure of analysis invites us to take a concept as primitive. But maybe God can analyse it and we can't.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson]
     Full Idea: The Fregean argument for platonism is that some true assertions contain singular terms which denote abstract objects if they denote anything; since the assertions are true, the singular terms denote.
     From: Timothy Williamson (Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects' [1988])
     A reaction: I am perplexed that anyone would rest their view of reality on such an argument. The obvious comparison would be with true remarks about blatantly fictional characters, or blatantly invented concepts such as 'checkmate'.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
     Full Idea: Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical.
     From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)
     A reaction: [compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness.
Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford]
     Full Idea: There are a number of reasons why we explain: out of sheer curiosity, to increase our control of a situation, to help understanding by simplifying or making familiar, to confer meaning or significance, and to give scientific authority to some statement.
     From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford]
     Full Idea: The powerful engine of my car can be explained by an examination of each of its parts, but it is not caused by them. They do not cause the engine; they constitute it.
     From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.174)
     A reaction: [example from Ruben 1990:221] This could be challenged, since there is clearly a causal connection between the constitution and the whole. We distinguish engine parts which contribute to the power from those which do not.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').