Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' and 'What are Sets and What are they For?'

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19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: The empty set is usually derived via Zermelo's axiom of separation. But the axiom of separation is conditional: it requires the existence of a set in order to generate others as subsets of it. The original set has to come from the axiom of infinity.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2)
     A reaction: They charge that this leads to circularity, as Infinity depends on the empty set.
The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: Some authors need to be told loud and clear: if there is an empty set, it is something, not nothing.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2)
     A reaction: I'm inclined to think of a null set as a pair of brackets, so maybe that puts it into a metalanguage.
We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: The empty set is said to be useful to express non-existence, but saying 'there are no Us', or ¬∃xUx are no less concise, and certainly less roundabout.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2)
Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: Suppose we introduce Ω not as a term standing for a supposed empty set, but as a paradigm of an empty term, not standing for anything.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 1.2)
     A reaction: This proposal, which they go on to explore, seems to mean that Ω (i.e. the traditional empty set symbol) is no longer part of set theory but is part of semantics.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: Thomason says with no unit sets we couldn't call {1,2}∩{2,3} a set - but so what? Why shouldn't the intersection be the number 2? However, we then have to distinguish three different cases of intersection (common subset or member, or disjoint).
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 2.2)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: A 'singularist', who refers to objects one at a time, must resort to the language of sets in order to replace plural reference to members ('Henry VIII's wives') by singular reference to a set ('the set of Henry VIII's wives').
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: A simple and illuminating point about the motivation for plural reference. Null sets and singletons give me the creeps, so I would personally prefer to avoid set theory when dealing with ontology.
We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: Plurals earn their keep in set theory, to answer Skolem's remark that 'in order to treat of 'sets', we must begin with 'domains' that are constituted in a certain way'. We can speak in the plural of 'the objects', not a 'domain' of objects.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: [Skolem 1922:291 in van Heijenoort] Zermelo has said that the domain cannot be a set, because every set belongs to it.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: Logical truths should be true no matter what exists, so true even if nothing exists. The classical predicate calculus, however, makes it logically true that something exists.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 5.1)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: If mathematics was purely concerned with mathematical objects, there would be no room for applied mathematics.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 5.1)
     A reaction: Love it! Of course, they are using 'objects' in the rather Fregean sense of genuine abstract entities. I don't see why fictionalism shouldn't allow maths to be wholly 'pure', although we have invented fictions which actually have application.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley]
     Full Idea: Identifying numbers with sets may mean one of three quite different things: 1) the sets represent the numbers, or ii) they are the numbers, or iii) they replace the numbers.
     From: Oliver,A/Smiley,T (What are Sets and What are they For? [2006], 5.2)
     A reaction: Option one sounds the most plausible to me. I will take numbers to be patterns embedded in nature, and sets are one way of presenting them in shorthand form, in order to bring out what is repeated.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The aim of all political associations is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 02)
     A reaction: Radical thinkers will obviously be doubtful about property being on the list, because that entrenches huge inequalities, between peasants and their landlords. Resistance to oppression will bother the likes of Edmund Burke.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to take part in person or through their representatives in its formulation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or whether it punishes.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06)
     A reaction: Now you are wondering who qualifies as a 'citizen'. Rousseau would have been excited until he found that the citizens could send 'representatives', instead of voting themselves. Rousseau aimed at foundational laws, not all of the laws.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: Any society in which the guarantee of Rights is not assured, nor the separation of Power determined, has no Constitution.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 16)
     A reaction: I wonder if they had Britain in mind with this one? The British latched onto Magna Carta in the early 19th century, because it offered some semblance of a constitution.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: No man is to be molested on account of his opinions, even his religious opinions, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 10)
     A reaction: Virtually any opinion will 'disturb' the established order a little bit, so this gives the option of suppressing quite mild beliefs, on the grounds of their small disturbance. It is still a wonderful proposal, though.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of man's most precious rights. Every citizen may therefore speak, write, and publish freely; except that he shall be responsible for the abuse of that freedom in cases determined by law.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 11)
     A reaction: Wonderful, and very nicely expressed. Tom Paine will have been a huge influence on this clause.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: All citizens being equal in the eyes of the law are equally eligible to all honours, offices, and public employments, according to their abilities and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06)
     A reaction: This proclamation of meritocracy must have rung bells around the cities of Europe, and was a reason why many people enjoyed being invaded by Napoleon.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no man may be deprived of it except when public necessity, lawfully constituted, evidently requires it; and on condition that a just indemnity be paid in advance.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 17)
     A reaction: This covers compulsory purchase orders. Is the ownership of slaves inviolable? Will aristocrats be compensated for the confiscation of their vast estates?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: For the maintenance of public force and the expenses of administration, a common contribution is indispensable. It must be equally apportioned among all citizens according to their abilities.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 13)
     A reaction: Presumably this enshrines graduated income tax, an eighteenth century invention. Could you contribute just by your labour, or by fighting for the army? Those may be greater contributions than mere money.