70 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 6814 | Instead of prayer and charity, sinners pursue vain disputes and want their own personal scripture [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: The sinners will say 'we never prayed or fed the hungry. We engaged in vain disputes and denied the Day of Reckoning'. Indeed, each one of them demands a scripture of his own to be unrolled before him. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.74) | |
| A reaction: The implication seems to be that most disputes are 'vain'. The charge that everyone wants a 'scripture of his own' is a nice challenge to the world of liberal education, where we are all enjoined to pursue our personalised routes to our own truth. |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account of names and definite descriptions was concerned to preserve the law of excluded middle, according to which every sentence is either true or false (but it is not obvious that the law ought to be preserved). | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: That is the strongest form of excluded middle, but things work better if every sentence is either 'true' or 'not true', leaving it open whether 'not true' actually means 'false'. |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's view 'Elizabeth II = Queen of England' is only superficially an identity-statement; really it is a predication, and attributes a complex relational property to Elizabeth. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: The original example is 'Scott = author of Waverley'. Why can't such statements be identities, in which the reference of one half of the identity is not yet known? 'The murderer is violent' and 'Smith is violent' suggests 'Smith is the murderer'. |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I take the notion of the variable as fundamental. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.42) | |
| A reaction: A key idea of twentieth century philosophy, derived from Frege and handed on to Quine. A universal term, such as 'horse', is a variable, for which any particular horse can be its value. You can calculate using x, and generalise about horses. |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that names do not express a Fregean sense, ...but are disguised definite descriptions, of the form 'the F'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: Of course, Russell then has a famous theory about definite descriptions, which turns them into quantifications. |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell (and Frege) thought that Mill was wrong about names: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description abbreviated or disguised. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1 | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to oversimplify this issue, one way or the other, but essentially one has to agree with Kripke that naming does not inherently involve description, but is a 'baptism', without initial content. Connotations and descriptions accrue to a name. |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view of names, understood as a definite description, which is understood as a quantificational phrase, is not to contribute an object to propositions, but to contribute a complex of properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict the role of constants in first-logic, which are the paradigm names, picking out an object in the domain. Kripke says names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles. |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's proposal that a natural name is an abbreviated description invites four objections: not all speakers can produce descriptions; the description could be false; no one description seems special; and descriptions usually contain names. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 8.74 | |
| A reaction: The best reply on behalf of Russell is probably to concede all of these points, but deny that any of them are fatal. Most replies will probably say that they are possible true descriptions, rather than actual limited, confused or false ones. |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| Full Idea: Russell defined a logically proper name to be one the meaning of which is its referent. However, his internalist epistemology led him to deny that the words we ordinarily call names are logically proper. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 1.25 |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| Full Idea: For Russell, a logically proper name introduces its referent into the proposition, whereas a description introduces a certain quantificational structure, not its denotation. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L0 | |
| A reaction: I have very strong resistance to the idea that the actual referent could ever become part of a proposition. I am not, and never have been, part of a proposition! Russell depended on narrow 'acquaintance', which meant that few things qualified. |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Though someone just beginning to learn English might take it as one, "nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: If someone replies to "nobody's there" with "show him to me!", presumably it IS a singular term - just one that doesn't work very well. If you want to get on in life, treat it as a quantifier; if you just want to have fun... |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory used quantification to eliminate singular terms, which could be meaningful without denoting anything. He reparsed such sentences so they appeared as predicates instead of names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy IX.A.2 |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account implies that all sentences composed of an empty name and a predicate are false, including 'Pegasus was a mythical creature'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Russell insists that such sentences contain a concealed existence claim, which they clearly don't. |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
| A reaction: The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail. |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory makes an exciting distinction between logical and grammatical form, but any theory which says that every positive statement, without distinction, about objects which don't exist is false, has to be wrong. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: When a statement of being or non-being is analysed by Russell's theory of descriptions it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity, so the being of such an entity is no longer presupposed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Willard Quine - On What There Is p.6 |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell showed that his theory of definite descriptions affords solutions to each of four vexing logical problems: the Problems of Apparent Reference to Non-existents and Negative existentials, Frege's Puzzle about Identity, and Substitutivity. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language 2.Over | |
| A reaction: You must seek elsewhere for the explanations of the four problems, but this gives some indication of why Russell's theory was famous, and was felt to be a breakthrough in explaining logical forms. |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| Full Idea: With the devices of the Theory of Descriptions at hand, it was no longer necessary to take 'the' as indefinable, and it was possible to diminish greatly the number of entities to which a logical system is ontologically committed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.13 | |
| A reaction: Illuminating, because it shows that ontology is what drove Russell at this time, and really they were all searching for Quine's 'desert landscapes', which minimalise commitment. |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the notions of predicate logic - specifically, 'some', 'every', and 'same as'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.2.7 | |
| A reaction: This helpfully clarifies Russell's project - to find the logical form of every sentence, expressed in terms which are strictly defined and consistent. This huge project now looks rather too optimistic. Artificial Intelligence would love to complete it. |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of 'the baby is crying' seems to imply that this can only be true if there is just one baby in the world; ..to dispose of the objection, it seems necessary to appeal implicitly or explicitly to a 'domain of discourse'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This objection leads to ordinary language philosophy, and the 'pragmatics' of language. It is standard in modern predicate logic to specify the domain over which an expression is quantified. |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that descriptions be treated along with the quantifiers, which departs from Frege, who treated descriptions as proper names. ...the problem was that names invoke objects, and there is no object in failed descriptions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.16 | |
| A reaction: Maybe we just allow intentional objects (such as unicorns) into our ontology? Producing a parsimonious ontology seems to be the main motivation of most philosophy of language. Or maybe names are just not committed to actual existence? |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell attempted to avoid Meinong's strategy (of saying 'The present King of France' refers to a 'non-existent object') by denying that definite descriptions are proper names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.7 | |
| A reaction: Russell claimed that there was a covert existence claim built into a definite description. What about descriptions in known counterfactual situations ('Queen of the Fairies')? |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Since Russell did not want to introduce non-existent objects, or declare many sentences meaningless, he prevented the problem from getting started, by denying that 'the present King of France is bald' is really a subject-predicate sentence. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 4.1 |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory says that sentences which apparently serve to refer to particulars are really assertions about properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: Right. Which is why particulars get marginalised in Russell, and universals take centre stage. I can't help suspecting that talk of de re/de dicto reference handles this problem better. |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Some logicians charge that the theory of descriptions as it stands is formally inadequate because it lacks explicit conventions for the scope of quantifiers, and that when these conventions are added the theory becomes unduly complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.97 | |
| A reaction: [Especially in modal contexts, apparently] I suppose if the main point is to spell out the existence commitments of the description, then that has to include quantification, for full generality. |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes claimed that the behaviour of definite non-count descriptions shows Russell's Theory of Descriptions itself to be false. ....but it isn't a general theory of descriptions, but precisely a theory of singular descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Henry Laycock - Words without Objects 3.1 |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases are central to mathematics, especially in Russell's 'logicist' theory, in which they are crucial to identifying classes ('the class of all mortal beings', 'the class of natural numbers'). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This explains the motivation for Russell's theory of definite descriptions, since he thinks reference is achieved by description. Russell nearly achieved an extremely complete philosophical system. |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions has as an immediate consequence the doctrine that molecular sentences containing definite descriptions are syntactically ambiguous as regards the scope of the definite description. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David Kaplan - How to Russell a Frege-Church I | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is a virtue of Russell's account, and an advert for analytic philosophy, because it reveals an ambiguity which was there all the time. |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Nowadays Russell's position is routinely put by saying that existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier and only by that. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: We must keep separate how you express existence, and what it is. Quantifiers seem only to be a style of expressing existence; they don't offer any insight into what existence actually is, or what we mean by 'exist'. McGinn dislikes quantifiers. |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions allows us to avoid being ontologically committed to objects simply by virtue of using descriptions which seemingly denote them. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 1.1.2 | |
| A reaction: This I take to be why Russell's theory is a famous landmark. I personally take ontological commitment to be independent of what we specifically say. Others, like Quine, prefer to trim what we say until the commitments seem sound. |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: The real Platonic entities left standing after the Theory of Descriptions were propositions (not classes or numbers), and their constituents did not include denoting concepts or classes, but only individuals (Socrates) and universals (mortality). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Propositions look like being the problem here. If we identify them with facts, it is not clear how many facts there are in the universe, independent of human thought. Indeed, how many universals are there? Nay, how many individuals? See Idea 7534. |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view makes it impossible to attribute existence to properties, and this would have to be declared ill-formed and meaningless. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a powerful criticism, used to support McGinn's view that existence cannot be analysed, using quantifiers or anything else. |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell says one won't find the present King of France on the list of bald things, nor on the list of things that are not bald. It would seem that this gives rise to a violation of the law of excluded middle. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 2 | |
| A reaction: It's a bit hard to accuse the poor old King of violating a law when he doesn't exist. |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this. Presumably phrases which appear to refer actually point at other parts of language rather than the world. |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: If I am right, referring is not the same as denoting and the referential use of definite descriptions is not recognised on Russell's view. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Keith Donnellan - Reference and Definite Descriptions §I | |
| A reaction: This introduces a new theory of reference, which goes beyond the mere contents of linguistic experessions. It says reference is an 'external' and 'causal' affair, and so a definite description is not sufficient to make a reference. |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.43) | |
| A reaction: This is the important idea that the sentence is the basic unit of meaning, rather than the word. I'm not convinced that this dispute needs to be settled. Words are pretty pointless outside of propositions, and propositions are impossible without words. |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If we say 'Scott is the author of Waverley', we assert an identity of denotation with a difference of meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.46) | |
| A reaction: This shows Russell picking up Frege's famous distinction, as shown in 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. To distinguish the meaning from the reference was one of the greatest (and simplest) clarifications ever offered of how language works. |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: In Russell's definition of 'denoting', a definite description denotes an entity if that entity fits the description uniquely. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.2 | |
| A reaction: [Recanati cites Donnellan for this] Hence denoting is not the same thing as reference. A description can denote beautifully, but fail to refer. Donnellan says if denoting were reference, someone might refer without realising it. |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell, since he eliminates descriptions from his primitive notation, seems to hold in 'On Denoting' that the notion of 'sense' is illusory. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 04 | |
| A reaction: Presumably we can eliminate sense from formal languages, but natural languages are rich in connotations (or whatever we choose to call them). |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell assumes that it is expressions which refer if anything does, but strictly speaking it is WE who refer with the use of expressions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: This sounds right. Russell is part of the overemphasis on language which plagued philosophy after Frege. Words are tools, like searchlights or pointing fingers. |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Russell rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, on the grounds that, if reference is mediated by sense, we lose the idea of direct acquaintance and succumb to Descriptivism. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 1.1 | |
| A reaction: [15,000th IDEA in the DB!! 23/3/2013, Weymouth] Recanati claims Russell made a mistake, because you can retain the sense/reference distinction, and still keep direct acquaintance (by means of 'non-descriptive senses'). |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell does not claim that Frege's notion of sense is incoherent, but rather that it is superfluous. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9 | |
| A reaction: My initial reaction to this is that the notion of strict and literal meaning (see Idea 7309) is incredibly useful. Some of the best jokes depend on the gap between implications and strict meaning. How could metaphors be explained without it? |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions proceeds by sketching the truth conditions of sentences containing descriptions, and arguing on various grounds that they are the correct truth conditions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: It seems important to see both where Russell was going, and where Davidson has come from. The whole project of finding the logical form of sentences (which starts with Frege and Russell) implies that truth conditions is what matters. |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In every proposition that we can apprehend, ...all the constituents are real entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.56), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the 'Russellian' concept of a proposition. It strikes me as entirely wrong. The examples are always nice concrete objects like Mont Blanc, but as an account of sophisticated general propositions it seem hopeless. |
| 6828 | You may break off a treaty if you fear treachery from your ally [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: If you fear treachery from any of your allies, you may retaliate by breaking off your treaty with them; Allah does not love the treacherous. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: I do not think this is good advice. Everybody fears treachery, but if we all acted on that fear human relationships and society would immediately collapse. If anyone thought this was good advice, I would not want to make a treaty with them. |
| 6823 | Repay evil with good and your enemies will become friends (though this is hard) [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Requite evil with good, and he who is your enemy will become your dearest friend; but none will attain this save those who endure with fortitude and are greatly favoured by Allah. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.41) | |
| A reaction: This seems opposed to some of the more vengeful remarks in the Koran. It strikes me as good common sense, since vengeance only seems to breed counter-vengeance. It doesn't carry the full altruistic commitment, though, of unrewarded love. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 6826 | Allah rewards those who are devout, sincere, patient, humble, charitable, chaste, and who fast [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Allah will bestow forgiveness and a rich reward on those, both men and women, who are devout, sincere, patient, humble, charitable and chaste; who fast and are ever mindful of Allah. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.33) | |
| A reaction: Most people would still agree that all of these are virtues, though other lists will show interesting virtues that are not mentioned here, and many on this list seem overrated in the modern pantheon of virtues. |
| 6822 | Those who avenge themselves when wronged incur no guilt [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Those who avenge themselves when wronged incur no guilt. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.42) | |
| A reaction: Compare Ideas 1659 (Protagoras), 346 (Socrates), 6288 (Jesus), and 4286 (Scruton!). In the light of those ideas, this comment in the Koran strikes me as coming from an older and less civilized world. |
| 6833 | Punish theft in men or women by cutting off their hands [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: As for the man or woman who is guilty of theft, cut off their hands to punish them for their crimes. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: I find this shocking because it is irrevocable and offers no hope of redemption. It is particularly shocking that the text does not enjoin any caution about inflicting the punishment on the young, most of whom reform from thieving in later life. |
| 6832 | Killing a human, except as just punishment, is like killing all mankind [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: We laid it down for the Israelites that whoever killed a human being, except as a punishment for murder or other wicked crimes, should be looked upon as though he had killed all mankind. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: It seems inconceivable that the Koran could be used to justify indiscriminate terrorism, in the light of remarks such as this. |
| 6825 | Do not kill except for a just cause [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Do not kill except for a just cause. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.25) | |
| A reaction: Slippery slope! I can see that pleasure would not be a just cause, and ensuring the entry of all humanity to paradise might be one, but I find the area in between a little unclear. The Koran seems to allow you to decide for yourself. |
| 6811 | Allah is lord of creation, compassionate, merciful, king of judgement-day [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Praise be to Allah, Lord of Creation, The Compassionate, the Merciful, King of Judgement-day! | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Exord) | |
| A reaction: The Muslim concept of God confronts directly a clear theological difficulty, a difficulty faced by any judge: the conflict between mercy and justice. Christianity seems to emphasise mercy, and Islam emphasises justice. |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'There is one and only one entity x which is most perfect; that one has all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore that one exists' fails as a proof because there is no proof of the first premiss. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.54) | |
| A reaction: This is the modern move of saying that existence (which is 'not a predicate', according to Kant) is actually a quantifier, which isolates the existence claim being made about a variable with a bunch of predicates. McGinn denies Russell's claim. |
| 6819 | True believers see that Allah made the night for rest and the day to give light [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Do they not see how We have made the night for them to rest in and the day to give them light? Surely there are signs in this for true believers. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.27) | |
| A reaction: The main traditional argument for God implied in the Koran is the design argument. It is clear from this that Islam will not be comfortable with Darwinian evolution, which implies we are 'designed' for the Earth, not the Earth for us. |
| 6818 | Allah cannot have begotten a son, as He is self-sufficient [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: They say: 'Allah has begotten a son.' Allah forbid! Self-sufficient is He. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: This is quite persuasive, except that the point of Jesus is that he suffers a cruel death, and we are required to identify with God's parental feelings here, His involvement, which would not occur with the death of one of His prophets. |
| 6831 | He that kills a believer by design shall burn in Hell for ever [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: He that kills a believer by design shall burn in Hell for ever. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This would appear to make modern indiscriminate urban terrorism a damning sin for a Muslim. |
| 6821 | I created mankind that it might worship Me [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: I created mankind and the jinn in order that they might worship Me. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.51) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a view common to all the monotheistic religions, with monasticism as its clearest (and most logical) outcome. Nietzsche is the most obvious opponent of this idea that the abasement of mankind is its highest ideal. |
| 6815 | Be patient with unbelievers, and leave them to the judgement of Allah [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Bear patiently with what the unbelievers say, and leave their company without recrimination; leave to Me those that deny the truth. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.73) | |
| A reaction: This explicitly says Muslims should not attack infidels simply for their unbelief in Allah. |
| 6834 | Unbelievers try to interpret the ambiguous parts of the Koran, simply to create dissension [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Some of the verses of the Koran are precise in meaning - they are the foundations of the Book - and others are ambiguous. Disbelievers follow the ambiguous part, to create dissension by seeking to explain it. No one knows its meaning except Allah. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to ask why some of the verses are ambiguous. The implication here is that they are a deliberate test for believers, like the apple in the garden of Eden. |
| 6817 | The Koran is certainly composed by Allah; no one could compose a chapter like it [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: This Koran could not have been composed by any but Allah. It is beyond doubt from the Lord of the Creation. If they say: 'It is your own invention', say: 'Compose one chapter like it. Call on your false gods to help you!' | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: I find this unpersuasive, firstly because I couldn't imitate the sonnets of Shakespeare either, and secondly because the authority of a text must be asserted outside the text, not within it. Scribble "this is a ten pound note" on a scrap of paper. |
| 6827 | Make war on the unbelievers until Allah's religion reigns supreme [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Make war on the unbelievers until idolatry is no more and Allah's religion reigns supreme. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This should presumably be seen in context, as a war speech written during a conflict, like Churchill 'fighting them on the beaches', which does not apply to modern German tourists. However, one worries about how fundamentalists might read it. |
| 6829 | There shall be no compulsion in religion [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: There shall be no compulsion in religion. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict some of the more aggressive remarks in the Koran, such as Idea 6827. As I read it, the three non-compelling ideas that lead to true religion in the Koran are desire for paradise, fear of punishment, and worship of divine design. |
| 6824 | Do not split into sects, exulting in separate beliefs [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Do not split up your religion into sects, each exulting in its own beliefs. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.30) | |
| A reaction: This seems like good advice to a religion, but it is very difficult to retrace steps and reunite once it has happened. Which sect should make the greatest concessions? Must they both admit to being somewhat wrong? |
| 6820 | The righteous shall dwell on couches in gardens, wedded to dark-eyed houris [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: In fair gardens the righteous shall dwell in bliss, rejoicing in what their Lord will give them. They shall recline on couches ranged in rows. To dark-eyed houris We shall wed them. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.52) | |
| A reaction: What I find distressing about this is that we have gradually worked out how young men can recline on couches in gardens with dark-eyed houris before death, and the Koran seems to depict it as the highest form of living. |
| 6812 | Heaven will be reclining on couches, eating fruit, attended by virgins [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: All who dwell in heaven shall recline on couches lined with thick brocade, and within their reach will hang the fruits of gardens; they shall dwell with bashful virgins whom neither men nor jinnee will have touched before. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.55) | |
| A reaction: In the seventh century this was more impressive than it seems now. I still find it sad (though understandable) that paradise must always be depicted in terms of physical pleasure. Aristotle wouldn't have yearned for such an immortality. |
| 6816 | The unbelievers shall drink boiling water [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: As for the unbelievers, they shall drink boiling water. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be presented not only as a threat to unbelievers, but also as a satisfaction to believers. |
| 6830 | Unbelievers will have their skin repeatedly burned off in hell [Mohammed] |
| Full Idea: Those that deny Our revelations We will burn in Hell-fire. No sooner will their skins be consumed that We shall give them other skins, so that they may truly taste Our scourge. Allah is mighty and wise. | |
| From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Of all the accounts of hell in the Koran, this strikes me as the most alarming. I cannot think of a worse infliction, because here every nerve which can experience pain will suffer it (though the drinking of boiling water, Idea 6816, will make it worse). |