Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Scepticism' and 'Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23674 If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
     Full Idea: If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
23675 We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
     Full Idea: It is a first principle of morals, that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 6)
     A reaction: This negative form of the rule is more plausible than the positive form, presumably because there is more consensus about what we all dislike than what we all prefer. But presents for people that they would like, not that you like.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
23672 To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
     Full Idea: A man cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: Thus are Aristotle and Kant united in a simple sentence. Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person thereby sees what is the right thing to do, but I take 'duty' to imply a requirement which comes not from good character but from external society.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
23673 Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
     Full Idea: I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy!
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
20365 We only see points in motion, and thereby infer movement [Rescher]
     Full Idea: We perceive motion only as isolated points, and then infer it without actually seeing it.
     From: Nicholas Rescher (Scepticism [1980], §112)
     A reaction: Note how writing suddenly becomes readable as you slow down on entering a railway station. Is that points suddenly becoming unified? This is an empiricist endorsement of Russell's 'at-at' account of motion.