Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Anselm's Argument' and 'On Freedom'

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6 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Derivative truths are of two sorts: some are analysed into original truths, others admit of an infinite process of analysis. The former are necessary, the latter are contingent.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.108)
     A reaction: An intriguing proposal. Hume would presumably see contingent truths as being analysed until you reach 'impressions'. Analysis of necessary truths soon comes to the blinding light of what is obvious, but analysis of contingency never gets there.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Only God sees contingent truths a priori.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.95)
     A reaction: This because everything is interconnected, and the whole picture must be seen to understand a contingent truth.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106)
     A reaction: A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We can regard it as certain that everything is done by God in the most perfect way, that he does nothing which is contrary to reason.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.109)
     A reaction: The famous optimism which Voltaire laughed at in 'Candide'. I can't help thinking that there is an ideal of God being ABOVE reason. We reason, and give reasons, because we are unsure, and life is a struggle. The highest ideal is mystically self-evident.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm]
     Full Idea: God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.
     From: Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2)
     A reaction: The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely?