17 ideas
| 19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: Man has his being in truth - if he sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself. Whoever betrays truth betrays himself. It is not a question of lying - but of acting against one's conviction. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 038) | |
| A reaction: Does he condone lying here, as long as you don't believe the lie? We would call it loss of integrity. |
| 19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: The distinction between delusion and truth lies in the difference in their life functions. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 008) | |
| A reaction: Pure pragmatism, it seems. We might expect doubts about objective truth from a leading light of the Romantic movement. |
| 19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: The more our senses are refined, the more capable they become of distinguishing between individuals. The highest sense would be the highest receptivity to particularity in human nature. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 072) | |
| A reaction: I adore this idea!! It goes into the collection of support I am building for individual essences, against the absurd idea of kinds as essences (when they are actually categorisations). It also accompanies particularism in ethics. |
| 19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: Experience is the test of the rational - and vice versa. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 010) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful remark. Surely we can't ignore our need to test claims of pure logic by filling in the variables with concrete instances, to assess validity? And philosophy without examples is doomed to be abstract waffle. Coherence is the combined aim. |
| 19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: The seat of the soul is the point where the inner and the outer worlds touch. Wherever they penetrate each other - it is there at every point of penetration. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 020) | |
| A reaction: I surmise that Spinoza's dual-aspect monism is behind this interesting remark. See the related idea from Schopenhauer. |
| 19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: Before abstraction everything is one - but one as chaos is - after abstraction everything is again unified - but in a free alliance of independent, self-determined beings. A crowd has become a society - a chaos is transformed into a manifold world. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 094) | |
| A reaction: Personally I take (unfashionably) psychological abstraction to one of the key foundations of human thought, so I love this idea, which gives a huge picture of how the abstracting mind relates to reality. |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| Full Idea: The best translation of 'phronesis' is probably not 'prudence' (which implies a non-moral motive), or 'practical wisdom' (which makes it sound contemplative), but 'practical intelligence', or just 'intelligence'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.3) |
| 19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: Everything beautiful is a self-illuminated, perfect individual. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 101) | |
| A reaction: It is a commonplace to describe something beautiful as being 'perfect'. Unfinished masterpieces are interesting exceptions. Are only 'individuals' beautiful? Is unity a necessary condition of beauty? Bad art fails to be self-illuminated. |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship). |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics claimed our final good was pleasure, best achieved by seeking maximum intensity of pleasurable experiences, but they explicitly admitted that this was not happiness. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Instead of modern 'imperative' notions of ethics (involving obligation, duty and rule-following), ancient ethics uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], Intro) |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| Full Idea: An ethics of virtue moves from an initial interest in what we ought to do to an interest in the kinds of people we are and hope to be, because the latter is taken to be the best way of understanding the former. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.5) |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6) |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Why should I want to maximise my acting courageously? I act courageously when it is required. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: Nothing is more indispensable for true religious feeling than an intermediary - which connects us to the godhead. The human being is absolutely incapable of sustaining an immediate relation with this. | |
| From: Novalis (Miscellaneous Observations [1798], 073) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be a defence of priests and organised religion, and an implied attack on protestants who give centrality to private prayer and conscience. |