Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
     Full Idea: It is not out of the question to hold that without circular justifications there is no reasonableness at all. That is the view of a certain kind of coherence theorist.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 2)
     A reaction: This nicely captures a gut feeling I have had for a long time. Being now thoroughly converted to coherentism, I am drawn to the idea - like a moth to a flame. But how do we distinguish cuddly circularity from its cruel and vicious cousin?
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16186 The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen]
     Full Idea: The Barcan Formula and its converse gives expression to the most straightforward way of combining modal operators with classical quantification.
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1)
16187 The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen]
     Full Idea: The Barcan Formulas are a threat to 'actualism' in modal metaphysics, which seems regrettable since the Formulas are validated by standard modal logics, but clash with the plausible and attractive actualist view (that there are no merely possible things).
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1)
     A reaction: He notes that the Barcan Formulas 'appear to require quantification over possibilia'. So are you prepared to accept the 'possible elephant in your kitchen'? Conceptually yes, but actually no, I would have thought. So possibilia are conceptual.
16190 BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen]
     Full Idea: In accordance with the Barcan Formula we assume that if it is possible that Wittgenstein should have had a child, then something or other is possibly Wittgentein's child.
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §5)
     A reaction: Put like this it sounds unpersuasive. What is the something or other? Someone else's child? A dustbin? A bare particular? Wittgenstein's child? If it was the last one, how could it be Wittgenstein's child while only possibly being that thing?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16188 Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
     Full Idea: Serious Actualism is the view that in possible circumstances in which something does not exist there are no facts about it of any kind, including its very non-existence
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1 n4)
     A reaction: He suggests that the Converse Barcan Formula implies this view. It sounds comparable to the view of Presentism about time, that no future or past truthmakers exist right now. If a new square table were to exist, it would have four corners.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Propositions such as 'People usually tell the truth' seem to count as default reasonable, but it is odd to count them as a priori. Empirical indefeasibility seems the obvious way to distinguish those default reasonable propositions that are a priori.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 1)
     A reaction: Sounds reasonable, but it would mean that all the uniformities of nature would then count as a priori. 'Every physical object exerts gravity' probably has no counterexamples, but doesn't seem a priori (even if it is necessary). See Idea 9164.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
     Full Idea: I argue not that our most basic rules are a priori or empirically indefeasible, but that we treat them as empirically defeasible and indeed a priori; we don't regard anything as evidence against them.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
     A reaction: This is the fictionalist view of a priori knowledge (and of most other things, such as mathematics). I can't agree. Most people treat heaps of a posteriori truths (like the sun rising) as a priori. 'Mass involves energy' is indefeasible a posteriori.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Reliability is not a 'factual property'; in calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value. We place a high value on the reliability of our inductive and perceptual rules that lead to truth.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to be a contradiction of reliabilism, since truth is a pretty widespread epistemological value. If you do value truth, then eyes are pretty reliable organs for attaining it. Reliabilism is still wrong, but not for this reason.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Reliability is not all we want in an inductive rule. Completely reliable methods are available, such as believing nothing, or only believing logical truths. But we don't value them, but value less reliable methods with other characteristics.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 3)
     A reaction: I would take this excellent point to be an advertisement for inference to the best explanation, which requires not only reliable inputs of information, but also a presiding rational judge to assess the mass of evidence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
     Full Idea: We should concede that different people have slightly different basic epistemological standards. ..I doubt that any clear sense could be given to the notion of 'correctness' here.
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)
     A reaction: I think this is dead right. There is a real relativism about knowledge, which exists at the level of justification, rather than of truth. The scientific revolution just consisted of making the standards tougher, and that seems to have been a good idea.
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
     Full Idea: If some inductive rule is basic for us, in the sense that we never assess it using any rules other than itself, then it must be one that we treat as empirically indefeasible (hence as fully a priori, given that it will surely have default status).
     From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
     A reaction: This follows on from Field's account of a priori knowledge. See Ideas 9160 and 9164. I think of induction as simply learning from experience, but if experience goes mad I will cease to trust it. (A rationalist view).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').