89 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
| A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
| A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
| A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
| A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
| A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
| A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
| A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
| A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
| A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
| A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
| A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
| A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
| A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
| A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
| A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
| A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
| A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theos: god | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
| 18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The judgement of beauty makes a claim about its object, and can be supported by reasons. But the reasons do not compel the judgement and can be rejected without contradiction. So are they reasons or aren't they? | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that what he is really referring to is evidence rather than reasons. |
| 18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: How can you define truth, without already assuming the distinction between a true definition and a false one? | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: Don't say we have to accept truth as yet another primitive! Philosophers are out of business if all the basic concepts are primitive. The axiomatic approach to truth is an alternative - by specifying how the primitive should be used. |
| 18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Like the pleasure in friendship, the pleasure in beauty is curious: it aims to understand its object, and to value what it finds. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: At least he is trying to pin down the way in which aesthetic pleasure is phenomenologically different from other kinds of pleasure. |
| 18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: One aim of art is to present imaginary worlds, towards which we can adopt, as part of the integral aesthetic attitude, a posture of impartial concern. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |
| A reaction: It connects to the pleasure of watching people when they don't know they are being watched (such as watching the street from a restaurant window). Scruton's suggestion makes art resemble examples in philosophy. Cf the Frege-Geach problem in ethics. |
| 18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Maybe we can understand the 'beauty' of a building better if we describe it in another and less loaded way, as a form of fittingness or harmony. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: Almost everyone accepts the word 'beauty' for some things, such as a beautiful face, or goal, or steak. I remember a female interviewer writing that, reluctantly, the only appropriate word she could find for Nureyev's face was 'beautiful'. |
| 18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Beauty speaks to us of human fulfilment: not of things that we want, but of things that we ought to want, because human nature requires them. Such, at least, is my belief. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure how this works with a beautiful natural landscape. And what should I see that I ought to desire after viewing a great Rembrandt self-portrait? That I don't want to end up looking as bleak as that? Hm. Lofty words. |
| 18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Beauty is rationally founded; it challenges us to find meaning in its object, to make critical comparisons, and to examine our own lives and emotions in the light of what we find. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 9) | |
| A reaction: This is the Kantian tradition, and I'm not finding it very persuasive. It seems to place the value of beauty in what we do with it afterwards, and he seems to make beauty a necessary stepping stone to virtue. I see beauty as more sui generis. |
| 18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The experience of natural beauty is not a sense of 'how nice!' or 'how pleasant!' It contains a reassurance that this world is a right and fitting place to be - a home in which our human powers and prospects find confirmation. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 2) | |
| A reaction: To call it a 'reassurance' and 'confirmation' sounds like theism, anthropomorphism, or the pathetic fallacy. That said, this is certainly a heart-warming idea, and hence must contain a grain of truth. |
| 18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The Croce model is of an inarticulate inner state (an 'intuition') becoming articulate and conscious through artistic expression. The rival model is fitting thing together so as to create links which resonate in the audience's feelings. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |
| A reaction: The first model tells you nothing about how the artist imagines the audience reacting. The second model tells you nothing about what matters personally to the artist. A good theory must do both! |
| 18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The status of beauty as an ultimate value is questionable, in the way that the status of truth and goodness are not. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: We suspect that a love of beauty may be a bit parochial, where it is hard to conceive of living creatures anywhere in the cosmos who don't value the other two. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The condemnation of prostitution was not just puritan bigotry; it was a recognition of a profound truth, that you and your body are not two things but one, and by selling the body you harden your soul. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |
| A reaction: No one, I imagine, who condones or even enthuses about prostitution would hope that their own daughter followed the profession, so there is something wrong with it. But must an enthusiastic and cheerful prostitute necessarily have a hard soul? |