Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Status of Content' and 'Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism'

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5 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth

6345	Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
	Full Idea: Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory.
	From: report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8
	A reaction: I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism

8724	The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
	Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that the meaning of 'know' changes from the courtroom to the living room and back again; no more than for supposing that 'vacuum' changes from the laboratory to the cannery.
	From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 2.1)
	A reaction: I disagree. Lots of words change their meaning (or reference) according to context. Flat, fast, tall, clever. She 'knows a lot' certainly requires a context. The bar of justification goes up and down, and 'knowledge' changes accordingly.

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism

8722	No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
	Full Idea: I argue for the thesis that no one ever knows about anything, ...and that consequently no one is ever justified or at all reasonable in anything.
	From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], Intro)
	A reaction: The premiss of his book seems to be that knowledge is assumed to require certainty, and is therefore impossible. Unger has helped push us to a more relaxed and fallibilist attitude to knowledge. 'No one is reasonable' is daft!

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism

8723	An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
	Full Idea: The evil scientist might not only be deceiving you with his electrodes; maybe he has just created you with your ostensible memory beliefs and experiences, and for good measure he will immediately destroy you, so in the next moment you no longer exist.
	From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 1.12)
	A reaction: This is based on Russell's scepticism about memory (Idea 2792). Even this very train of thought may not exist, if the first half of it was implanted, rather than being developed by you. I cannot see how to dispute this possibility.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').