Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis' and 'Classes and Attributes'

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3 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
We could accept the integers as primitive, then use sets to construct the rest [Cohen]
     Full Idea: A very reasonable position would be to accept the integers as primitive entities and then use sets to form higher entities.
     From: Paul J. Cohen (Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis [1966], 5.4), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For?
     A reaction: I find this very appealing, and the authority of this major mathematician adds support. I would say, though, that the integers are not 'primitive', but pick out (in abstraction) consistent features of the natural world.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: Attributes and classes are said to be distinguished by the fact that whereas no two classes coincide in membership, there are supposed to be distinct but coextensive attributes.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Classes and Attributes [1967], §2)
     A reaction: This spells out the standard problem of renates and cordates, that creatures with hearts and with kidneys are precisely coextensive, but that these properties are different. Cartwright then attacks the distinction.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').