Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'A Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'Persons, Character and Morality'

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5 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data are neutral uninterpreted experiences, separated from objects and judgements [Angeles]
     Full Idea: Sense-data are that which is given to us directly and immediately such as colour, shape, smell, without identification of them as specific material objects; they are usually thought to be devoid of judgment, interpretation, bias, preconception.
     From: Peter A. Angeles (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1981], p.254)
     A reaction: This definition makes them clearly mental (rather than being qualities of objects), and they sound like Hume's 'impressions'. They are not features of the external world, but the first steps we make towards experience.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
     A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits.
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
     A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I)
     A reaction: Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip?