Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'A Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'A Puzzle about Belief'

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3 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data are neutral uninterpreted experiences, separated from objects and judgements [Angeles]
     Full Idea: Sense-data are that which is given to us directly and immediately such as colour, shape, smell, without identification of them as specific material objects; they are usually thought to be devoid of judgment, interpretation, bias, preconception.
     From: Peter A. Angeles (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1981], p.254)
     A reaction: This definition makes them clearly mental (rather than being qualities of objects), and they sound like Hume's 'impressions'. They are not features of the external world, but the first steps we make towards experience.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
     Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
     From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
     A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').