Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introducing Persons' and 'Causation'

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6 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
     Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
     A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
     Full Idea: If the mind is merely a bundle of states and events, it must be logically possible for the various elements of the bundle to exist on their own.
     From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (A))
     A reaction: Depends how literally you take the bundle metaphor, and how much you are worried about 'logical' possibility (which only seems to mean imaginable). The answers to these questions do not have to be all-or-nothing.
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
     Full Idea: What makes it true that a particular thought or experience is a member of one bundle rather than another?
     From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (B))
     A reaction: I'm not sure if you can answer this nice question without mentioning values. The mental events in are in my bundle because they matter to me (because they are related to my body, for which I am responsible). Compare picking my possessions out of a pile.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]
     Full Idea: We can have no conception of the particularity of conscious states prior to, and independently of, a conception of a particularity of persons.
     From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (C))
     A reaction: agrees with Butler
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
     Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
     A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.