3 ideas
8972 | What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Nothing in the world of nominalistically acceptable things could ground or explain the non-identity of the set {A,{A,B}} with the set {B,{A,B}}. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Existence,Ontological Commitment and Fictions [2003], p.154) | |
A reaction: [He cites Goodman for this thought] Van Inwagen is offering this to show that the existence of sets is abstract, whereas Goodman was denying the existence of sets altogether. I'm with Goodman. Nice example. |
168 | To understand morality requires a soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: Good and evil are meaningless to things that have no soul. | |
From: Plato (Letter Seven [c.352 BCE], 334) | |
A reaction: That is presumably psuché, and hence includes plants. Soulless things can still function well, but obviously that is not 'meaningful' to them. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |