Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Goodness and Choice' and 'De aequopollentia causae et effectus'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers

12735	Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: It follows from the nature of God that there is a fixed power of a definite magnitude [non vagam] in anything whatsoever, otherwise there would be no reasonings about those things.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (De aequopollentia causae et effectus [1679], A6.4.1964), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: This is double-edged. On the one hand there is the grand claim that the principle derives from divine nature, but on the other it derives from our capacity to reason and explain. No one doubts that powers are 'fixed'.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function

22381	Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
	Full Idea: Being a good father, or daughter, or friend seems to depend on one's intentions, rather than on such things as cleverness and strength.
	From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.138)
	A reaction: Not sure about that. In wartime a good father might need to be actually brave, and in times of hardship be actually economically successful. 'He meant well, but he was a hopeless father'?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function

22380	Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot]
	Full Idea: The word 'knife' names an object in respect of its function. That is not to say (simply) that it names an object which has a function, but also that the function is involved in the meaning of the word.
	From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.134)
	A reaction: It seems faintly possible that someone (a child, perhaps) could know the word and recognise the object, but not know what the object is for. Ditto with other things which have functional names.