Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Moral Beliefs' and 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?'

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8 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
23683 Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22485 Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
     Full Idea: What all these [non-cognitivist] theories try to do is to give the conditions of use of sentences such as 'It is morally objectionable to break promises', in terms of something which must be true about the speaker.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: A wonderfully simple and accurate analysis of this view. Compare analysing 'there is a bus coming towards you' in the same way. Sounds silly, but lots of modern philosophers see things that way.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23684 Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
23690 We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
     A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
     Full Idea: The mistake is to think that whatever 'grounds' for a moral judgement may have been given, someone may be unready, indeed unable, to make the moral judgement, because he has not got the attitude or feeling.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: This is roughly the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism, of how we still make moral judgements about situations where we ourselves are entirely disinterested (such as ancient historical events).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22487 Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
     Full Idea: The grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in facts about human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.207)
     A reaction: The best slogan I can find for summarising Foot's metaethics. The facts she refers to the basic human needs. She is right, and this almost bridges the fact-value divide (as long as you give a damn about human needs).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22379 The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
     A reaction: I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').