21 ideas
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: If we ask 'what must you know to understand a name?', the naïve answer is that one must know who or what it names - nothing more. (But no one would give this answer about what is needed to understand a definite description). | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is naive because names can be full of meaning ('the Empress'), or description and reference together ('there's the man who robbed me') and so on. It's a nice starting point though. A number can serve as a name. |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: The possible worlds framework suggests a way to express the idea that a particular is conceptually separable from its properties without relying on the rejected picture of a bare particular. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 5) | |
| A reaction: As I read him, Stalnaker's proposal just comes down to replacing each property in turn with a different one. 'Strip away' red by making it green. It being green in w1 doesn't throw extra light. Can it be a bare particular in w37? |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: A clarifying assumption is that if something might be true, then it might be true in some particular way. …Possible worlds begin from this, and the assumption that what might be true can be described as how a possibility might be realised. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 2) | |
| A reaction: This is a leading practitioner giving his best shot at explaining the rationale of the possible worlds approach, addressed to many sceptics. Most sceptics, I think, don't understand the qualifications the practitioners apply to their game. |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: I argue for the metaphysical neutrality of the possible worlds framework, but I do not suggest that its use is free of ontological commitment to possibilities (ways things might be, counterfactual situations, possible states of worlds). | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 2) | |
| A reaction: Glad to hear this, as I have always been puzzled at possible aspirations to eliminate modality (such as possibility) by introducing 'possible' worlds. Commitment to possibilities I take to be basic and unavoidable. |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: The main benefit of the possible worlds move is to permit one to paraphrase modal claims in an extensional language that has quantifiers, but no modal auxiliaries, so the semantic stucture of modal discourse can be discussed without the controversies. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 2) | |
| A reaction: The strategy introduces the controversy of possible worlds instead, but since they just boil down to collections of objects with properties, classical logic can reign. Possible worlds are one strategy alongside many others. |
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: The possible worlds framework that Kripke introduces should be understood not as a metaphysical theory, but as a methodological framework. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], Intro) | |
| A reaction: That's certainly how I see possible worlds. I lose no sleep over whether they exist. I just take a set of possible worlds to be like cells in a spreadsheet, or records in a database. |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: A rigid designator is a designator that denotes the same individual in all possible worlds; doesn't this presuppose that the same individuals can be found in differing possible worlds? | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is part of Stalnaker's claim that Kripke already has a metaphysics in place when he starts on his semantics and his theory of reference. Kripke needs a global domain, not a variable domain. Possibilities suggest variable domains to me. |
| 23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
| Full Idea: You haven't got a full idea of rationality until you've got morality within it. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35) | |
| A reaction: Does this mean that mathematical proofs are not rational, or that they are moral? |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: If you don't know what you are saying then you don't mean what you say, and also speakers generally mean what they say (in that what they say coincides with what they mean). | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4) | |
| A reaction: Both these thoughts seem completely acceptable and correct, but rely on something called 'meaning' that is distinct from saying. I would express this in terms of propositions, which I take to be mental events. |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of reference is criticised for vagueness. Causal connections are ubiquitous, and there are obviously many individuals that are causally implicated in the speaker's use of a name, but they aren't all plausible candidates for the referent. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a very good objection. Among all the causal links back to some baptised object, we have to pick out the referential link, which needs a criterion. |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: 'Descriptive' semantics gives a semantics for the language without saying how practice explains why the semantics is right; …'foundational' semantics concerns the facts that give expressions their semantic values. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Sounds parallel to the syntax/semantics distinction, or proof-theoretical and semantic validity. Or the sense/reference distinction! Or object language/metalanguage. Shall I go on? |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: To understand what is said in an utterance of 'The first dog born at sea was a basset hound', one needs to know what the world would have been like in order for what was said in that utterance to be true. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 3) | |
| A reaction: Put like that, the idea is undeniable. Understanding involves truth conditions. Does mean involve the understanding of the meaning. What do you understand when you understand a sentence? Just facts about dogs? Or something in the sentence? |
| 23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Practical rationality is goodness in respect of reason for actions, just as rationality of thinking is goodness in respect of beliefs. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35) | |
| A reaction: It is very Greek to think that rationality involves goodness. There seems to be a purely instrumental form of practical reason that just gets from A to B, as when giving accurate street directions to someone. |
| 23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
| Full Idea: One would need a very special, very Humean, view about reasons for actions to think a man doesn't have a reason unless he cares. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.34-5) | |
| A reaction: She says she used to believe this, but was wrong. It is hard to imagine acting for reasons if they don't care about anything at all (even that it's their job). But then people just do care about things. |
| 23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We describe defects in human beings in the same way as we do defects in plants and animals. …You cannot talk about a river as being defective. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: This is a much clearer commitment to naturalistic ethics than I have found in her more academic writings. My opinion of Foot (which was already high) went up when I read this interview. …She says vice is a defect of the will. |
| 23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There are concepts which apply only to living things, considered in their own right, which would include function, welfare, flourishing, interests and the good of something. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: This is a very Aristotelian view, with which I entirely agree. The central concept is function. |
| 23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
| Full Idea: A plant needs strong roots in the same way human beings need courage. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: I'm not quite convince by the analogy, but I strongly agree with her basic approach. |
| 23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
| Full Idea: If you say 'an owl should be able to see in the dark' …you're not going to think that there's a gap between facts and evaluation. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be a major and fundamental idea, which pinpoints the failure of Humeans to understand the world correctly. There is always total nihilism, of course, but that is a sort of blindness to how things are. Demanding 'proof' of values is crazy. |
| 23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
| Full Idea: I don't believe in ultimate principles that must be simply affirmed or denied, but rather in an appeal to the necessities of human life. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.37) | |
| A reaction: I agree. Humans have a strong tendency to elevate anything which they consider important into an absolute (such as the value of life, or freedom). |
| 23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
| Full Idea: You lose the sense of 'should' if you go on saying 'why should I?' when you've finished the argument about what is rational to do, what you've got reason to do. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], P.34) | |
| A reaction: Some people reify the concept of duty, so that they do what is required without caring about the reason. I suppose that would wither if they were shown that no reason exists. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |