Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Moral Beliefs' and 'Aesthetics'

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9 ideas

21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics

8108	Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner]
	Full Idea: Aesthetics traditionally has two presuppositions: the first is that there is a distinctive form of experience which is common to the appreciation of art and natural beauty; the second is that art has an essence or some sort of underlying unity.
	From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], Intro)
	A reaction: Both must come up for discussion. I think the biggest problem for the first one is the place of sexual attraction, or even fancying a prawn sandwich. The second has been weakened by Marcel Duchamp's urinal, and modern fringe arts.

21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art

8112	Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner]
	Full Idea: A strong tradition in aesthetics (the 'idealist' view) regards works of art as existing originally in the artist's mind, and the appreciation of art as a matter of re-creating the artist's mental object.
	From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 2.2)
	A reaction: He mentions Collingwood and Croce. Against this is the view (Idea 7268) that what goes on in the artist's mind is just irrelevant. Freud is important here, suggesting that the artist doesn't quite know what he or she is doing.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art

8111	Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner]
	Full Idea: The aesthetic objectivist faces the difficulty of accounting for the fact that pleasure is not in the object, and is necessary for, and not just a contingent accompaniment to, aesthetic response.
	From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.2.3)
	A reaction: The objectivist has to claim, not utterly implausibly, that if you don't get pleasure from certain works, then you 'ought' to. You can ignore a good work, but to deny that it gives pleasure is a failing in you.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

23683	Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
	Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings.
	From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
	A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

23684	Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
	Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
	From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
	A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.

23690	We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
	Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
	From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
	A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value

8109	Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner]
	Full Idea: I am not within my rights to declare an object beautiful until I have seen it myself, ..unlike moral judgement, which (arguably) does not presuppose either a felt response or personal acquaintance.
	From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.1)
	A reaction: Particularists might argue that moral judgements also require exposure to the actual situation, if they are to be authentic and authoritative. We can also discuss principles of aesthetics in the absence of examples.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good

22379	The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
	Full Idea: There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
	A reaction: I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').