Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Moral Relativism' and 'Frege on Apriority'

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5 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry

9159	You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
	Full Idea: Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of geometrical propositions seems to me to be thereby lost. Pure geometry involves spatial content, even if abstracted from physical space.
	From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority [2000], IV)
	A reaction: This supports Frege's view (against Quine) that geometry won't easily fit into the programme of logicism. I agree with Burge. You would be focusing on the syntax of geometry, and leaving out the semantics.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

22449	When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
	Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
	A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

22451	All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
	Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
	A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

22452	Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
	Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
	A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').