Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Moral Beliefs' and 'The Meaning of the Word'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


7 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
     Full Idea: Pragmatism insists that statements and beliefs are inertly and statically true only by courtesy: they practically pass for true; but you cannot define what you mean by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities.
     From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.2)
     A reaction: I think this clarifies an objection to pragmatism, because all functional definitions (e.g. of the mind, or of moral behaviour) are preceded by the question of WHY this thing is able to function in this way. What special quality makes this possible?
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
     Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true.
     From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.299), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 35 'Prag'
     A reaction: How you get from 'widely satisfactory' to 'true' is beyond my comprehension. This is dangerous nonsense. This view of truth seems to be a commonplace in American culture. Peirce hurray! James boo! James accepted verification, where possible.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
     A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
     A reaction: I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').