5 ideas
| 5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75) | |
| A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons. |
| 6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
| Full Idea: There is no necessary inference, from the fact that men familiar to us die when pierced through the heart, that all men do. | |
| From: Philodemus (On Signs (damaged) [c.50 BCE], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This is scepticism about the logic of induction, long before David Hume. This is said to be a Stoic argument against Epicureans - though on the whole Stoics are not keen on scepticism. |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80) | |
| A reaction: They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: God does not decide whether Adam should sin, but whether that series of things in which there is an Adam whose perfect individual notion involves sin should nevertheless be preferred to others. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.78) | |
| A reaction: Compare whether the person responsible for setting a road speed limit is responsible for subsequent accidents. Leibniz's belief that the world could have been made no better than it is (by an omnipotent being) strikes me as blind faith, not an argument. |