6215
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'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
For contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive, as when a traveller meets a shower, they both had sufficient causes, but they didn't cause one another, so we say it was contingent.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (Of Liberty and Necessity [1654], §95)
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A reaction:
Contingent nowadays means 'might not have happened', or 'does not happen in all possible worlds'. Personally I share Hobbes' doubts about the concept of contingency, and this is quite a good account of the misunderstanding.
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5506
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If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
If the soul had the nature of the body, it would have isolated members each unaware of the condition of the other;..there would be a particular soul as a distinct entity to each local experience, so a multiplicity of souls would administer an individual.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 4.2.2), quoted by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.15
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A reaction:
Of course, the modern 'modularity of mind' theory does suggest that we are run by a team, but a central co-ordinator is required, with a full communication network across the modules.
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21809
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Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Our own soul is of that same ideal nature [as the oldest god of them all], so that to consider it, purified, freed from all accruement, is to recognise in ourselves which we have found soul to be, honourable above the body. For what is body but earth?
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02)
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A reaction:
The strongest versions of substance dualism are religious in character, because the separateness of the mind elevates us above the grubby physical character of the world. I'm with Nietzsche on this one - this view is actually harmful to us.
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21825
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The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
We may not seek any point in space in which to seat the soul; it must be set outside of all space; its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10)
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A reaction:
You can't get more dualist than that. He doesn't seem bothered about the interaction problem. He likens such influence to the radiation of the sun, rather than to physical movement.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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21815
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Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Given this immobility of the Supreme ...what happened then? It must be a circumradiation, which may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generating from that unchanging substance,
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
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A reaction:
This is the answer given to the problem raised in Idea 21814. The sun produces energy, without apparent movement. Not an answer that will satisfy a physicist, but an interesting answer.
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21808
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Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Soul is the author of all living things, ...it has breathed life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, the divine stars in the sky; ...it is the principle distinct from all of these to which it gives law and movement and life.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02)
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A reaction:
This seems to derive from Anaxagoras, who is mentioned by Plotinus. The soul he refers to his not the same as our concept of God. Note the word 'law', which I am guessing is nomos. Not, I think, modern laws of nature, but closer to guidelines.
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21811
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Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous]; reason uttered is an image of reason stored within the soul, and similarly soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.03)
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A reaction:
It then turns out that Nous is secondary to the One, so there is a hierarchy of Being (which only enters at the Nous stage).
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