Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Life of Theseus' and 'Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus

1212	Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch]
	Full Idea: At intervals they removed old timbers from the preserved ship and replaced them with sound ones, so the ship became a classic illustration for the philosophers of the disputed question of growth and change, some saying it was the same, others different.
	From: Plutarch (Life of Theseus [c.85], 23)

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

18088	Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
	Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional.
	From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1)
	A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

18089	Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]
	Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
	From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
	A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.