16 ideas
10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Impredicative Definitions are definitions of an object by reference to the totality to which the object itself (and perhaps also things definable only in terms of that object) belong. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], n 13) |
15717 | Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The problem with the Axiom of Choice is that it allows an initiate (by an ingenious train of reasoning) to cut a golf ball into a finite number of pieces and put them together again to make a globe as big as the sun. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 9) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how this works (and I think it was proposed by the young Tarski), but it sounds like a real problem to me, for all the modern assumptions that Choice is fine. |
21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: In the superior realist and simple theory of types, the place of the axiom of reducibility is not taken by the axiom of classes, Zermelo's Aussonderungsaxiom. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.140-1) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 n3 | |
A reaction: This is Zermelo's Axiom of Separation, but that too is not an axiom of standard ZFC. |
10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
Full Idea: 'Mathematical Logic' is a precise and complete formulation of formal logic, and is both a section of mathematics covering classes, relations, symbols etc, and also a science prior to all others, with ideas and principles underlying all sciences. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.447) | |
A reaction: He cites Leibniz as the ancestor. In this database it is referred to as 'theory of logic', as 'mathematical' seems to be simply misleading. The principles of the subject are standardly applied to mathematical themes. |
10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
Full Idea: One may, on good grounds, deny that reference to a totality necessarily implies reference to all single elements of it or, in other words, that 'all' means the same as an infinite logical conjunction. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.455) |
10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
Full Idea: In order to be sure that new expression can be translated into expressions not containing them, it is necessary to have a survey of all possible expressions, and this can be furnished only by syntactical considerations. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.448) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
15712 | 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: You have 1 and 0, something and nothing. Adding gives us the naturals. Subtracting brings the negatives into light; dividing, the rationals; only with a new operation, taking of roots, do the irrationals show themselves. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Mind') | |
A reaction: The suggestion is constructivist, I suppose - that it is only operations that produce numbers. They go on to show that complex numbers don't quite fit the pattern. |
15711 | The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Nameless') | |
A reaction: Nice. That is, the rationals may be dense (you can always find another one in any gap), but the irrationals are continuous (no gaps). |
15714 | 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The 'commutative' laws say the order in which you add or multiply two numbers makes no difference; ...the 'associative' laws declare that regrouping couldn't change a sum or product (e.g. a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c ). | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
A reaction: This seem utterly self-evident, but in more complex systems they can break down, so it is worth being conscious of them. |
15715 | 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The 'distributive' law says you will get the same result if you first add two numbers, and then multiply them by a third, or first multiply each by the third and then add the results (i.e. a ˇ (b+c) = a ˇ b + a ˇ c ). | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
A reaction: Obviously this will depend on getting the brackets right, to ensure you are indeed doing the same operations both ways. |
10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The generalized Continuum Hypothesis says that there exists no cardinal number between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) |
10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
Full Idea: It has turned out that the solution of certain arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending arithmetic. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.449) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the famous result, from the great man himself, in the plainest possible English. |
10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Classes and concepts may be conceived of as real objects, ..and are as necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions, with neither case being about 'data'. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.456) | |
A reaction: Note that while he thinks real objects are essential for mathematics, be may not be claiming the same thing for our knowledge of logic. If logic contains no objects, then how could mathematics be reduced to it, as in logicism? |
10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) | |
A reaction: The issue is at what point in building an account of the foundations of mathematics (if there be such, see Putnam) these impure definitions should be ruled out. |
15713 | The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The claim that no number is greater than a million is confirmed by the first million test cases. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Extrapolate from this, and you can have as large a number of cases as you could possibly think of failing to do the inductive job. Love it! Induction isn't about accumulations of cases. It is about explanation, which is about essence. Yes! |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |