Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introduction to 'Absolute Generality'' and 'Atomism'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative Conception and the Limitation of Size Conception.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: There are set theories that countenance exceptions to the Principle of Separation in exchange for a universal set.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not immediately presuppose the existence of an all-inclusive domain. One could deny an all-inclusive domain but grant that some quantifications are sometimes unrestricted.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
     A reaction: Thus you can quantify over anything you like, but only from what is available. Eat what you like (in this restaurant).
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: There are doubts about whether absolute generality is possible, if there are certain concepts which are indefinitely extensible, lacking definite extensions, and yielding an ever more inclusive hierarchy. Sets and ordinals are paradigm cases.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.1)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
     A reaction: That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon]
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
     A reaction: I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The social contract theory …has a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual.
     From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.29)
     A reaction: It seems to be initiated by individuals who are only motivated by what is in it for them. This presumes self-sufficient adults, rather than children, or parents with children, or dependent people. The epitome of liberalism, perhaps.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: It would be incomprehensible and incoherent to ascribe rights to human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities (such as the right to beliefs or life-style) while at the same time denying that those capacities ought to be developed.
     From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33)
     A reaction: Developed by whom? The agent, their family, or the state? At what point has someone got a capacity, with no further requirement to develop it? Taylor pulls rather large rabbits out of small hats.
If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: If realising our freedom partly depends on the society and culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the shape of this society and culture.
     From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.47)
     A reaction: This is clearly in response to the critics of communitarianism who say that it is too conservative, because your values are created for you, by your community.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: We must all be nurtures by others as children, and we only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, children and so on. But this has nothing to do with any obligation to belong to political society.
     From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.42)
     A reaction: He is defending community, but not at that minimal human level. Political obligations follows from our need for a wider society, to achieve justice, education, travel, health etc. There are no rights without a society
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Most of those who want to affirm the primacy of rights are more interested in asserting the right of freedom, and in a sense which can only be attributed to humans.
     From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.40)
     A reaction: This is probably more pronounced in North America than in Europe. It may be that without freedom a lot of the other rights are impossible.
A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Asserting a right is more than issuing an injunction. It has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain properties or capacities, without which it would not make.
     From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33)
     A reaction: A simple right may arise from a contract, which could be quite trivial, and of no moral importance. The winner of the egg and spoon race has a right to the prize, which is an ice cream. I think he means legal rights in a state.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: It is standardly said that we need the right to property as an essential underpinning of life, but this is patently not true. …In reality it is actually seen as an essential part of a life of independence.
     From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.41)
     A reaction: Hence it has a high value for liberals, for whom an independent life is the prime social aspiration. The law of trespass will define the degree of independence provided by property.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Charles Taylor says the neutral [liberal] state undermines the sense of community which is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state.
     From: report of Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy'
     A reaction: As someone who believes in the welfare state, I think this is correct. Extreme individualistic liberalism is incompatible with a welfare state. A liberal society needs institutions which draw free individuals into the community.