Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Passions of the Soul' and 'The Facts of Causation'

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11 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10365 We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Mellor offers a distinction between 'facts' and 'facta' (the latter being the truth-makers for facts).
     From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: The idea is that 'facta' can do the work in causation, because 'facts' are not part of the world. This seems a very helpful terminology, which should be encouraged, since 'fact' is plainly ambiguous in current usage.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3654 The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
     Full Idea: The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
4015 For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Descartes sees passions not as opinions, but as functional devices that the Creator has designed for us to help preserve the body-soul substantial union.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8
     A reaction: I wonder what Descartes would have made of the theory of evolution?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
4313 Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire).
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172
     A reaction: A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond.
23989 There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
     Full Idea: Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence'
     A reaction: [not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Our merely willing to walk has the consequence that our legs move and we walk.
     From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 18), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 1 'Volitionism'
     A reaction: Stout attributes this to Descartes' dualism, as if legs are separate from persons. Stout says the idea of a prior mental act is not usually now considered as part of an action, or even to exist at all. If the volition is intentional, there is a regress.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16763 We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases and the organs that bring about bodily movement decay.
     From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], I.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: This sounds like a pretty major change in our concept of death, given that we all now agree with Descartes.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
4016 Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue.
     From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8
     A reaction: Presumably strength of will can serve evil ends, so this is a bit confusing.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
4785 Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Mellor argues that causal statements relate facts, where facts may be seen as whatever true propositions express.
     From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
     A reaction: Choose between 'facts', 'objects', 'conserved quantities, 'events' (the usual one) or 'processes'. I rather like processes (Salmon) as they are a better prospect as the building blocks of an ontology.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8408 Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]
     Full Idea: The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C.
     From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3
     A reaction: Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause.