Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Letters to Regius' and 'Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12251 Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Clearly no explanation can be given by these substantial forms for any natural action, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they do not understand them themselves, ...so they explain nothing.
     From: René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], 1642.01), quoted by David S. Oderberg - Real Essentialism 267 n5
     A reaction: [Oderberg gives refs for attack by Locke and Hume, p.66] Descartes' target is Aristotle's hylomorphism. The problem seems to be understanding what Aristotle meant, which is much more than mere 'shape'. More like 'controlling principle'.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6451 Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
     Full Idea: In the case of vision, sense data are a kind of inner picture show which itself only indirectly represents aspects of the external world.
     From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.347)
     A reaction: I'm unsure whether this is correct. Russell says the 'roughness' of the table is the sense datum. If it is even a possibility that there are unsensed sense-data, then they cannot be an aspect of the mind, as Blackburn is suggesting they are.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2866 A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
     Full Idea: Reliabilism is open to the counterexample that a belief may be the result of some generally reliable process (a pressure gauge) which was in fact malfunctioning on this occasion, when we would be reluctant to attribute knowledge to the subject.
     From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.327)
     A reaction: Russell's stopped clock that tells the right time twice a day. A good objection. Coming from a reliable source is very good criterion for good justification, but it needs critical assessment.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2864 The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
     Full Idea: Critics say that intuitionism in ethics explains nothing, but may merely function as a disguise for prejudice or passion.
     From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.198)
     A reaction: If someone claims to have an important moral intuition about something, you should carefully assess the person who has the intuition. I would trust some people a lot.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2865 Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
     Full Idea: Critics of prescriptivism have noted the problem that whilst accepting a command seems tantamount to setting oneself to obey it, accepting an ethical verdict is, unfortunately, consistent with refusing to be bound by it.
     From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.300)
     A reaction: We nearly all of us accept that our behaviour should be better than it actually is, so we accept the oughts but fail to act. Actually 'refusing', though, sounds a bit contradictory.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
16772 An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Descartes points out that an angelic mind, even if causally connected to a human body, would not experience the same sort of bodily sensations; it would, instead, simply observe flesh being torn, like a piece of paper.
     From: report of René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], III:493) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6
     A reaction: Does that mean that the angel could not have the experience even if it wanted to have it. So they can't pick up a cup either? So they can't make themselves known to us, even if they are desperate to? So the Annunciation never happened?