Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Some Remarks on Essentialism' and 'Time and Free Will'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

13952	Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: Essentialism, as I shall understand it, is the doctrine that among the attributes of a thing some are essential, others merely accidental. Its essential attributes are those it has necessarily, those it could not have lacked.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.149)
	A reaction: The problem with this, which Cartwright does not address, is that trivial and gerrymandered properties (such as having self-identity, or being 'such that 2+2=4') seem to be necessarily, but don't seem to constitute the essence of a thing.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

13954	The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: I see no reason for thinking essentialism unintelligible, but a chief perplexity is the obscurity of the grounds on which ratings of attributes as essential or accidental are to be made.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.158)
	A reaction: In that case some of us younger philosophers will have to roll up our sleeves and tease out the grounds for essentialism, starting with Aristotle and Leibniz, and ending with the successes of modern science.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

13955	Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: Apparently those who think essentialism unintelligible see support for their position in the doctrine that necessary truths are all analytic. Only relative to some mode of designation does it make sense to speak of an object as necessarily this or that.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.158)
	A reaction: He has in mind Quine and his mathematician-cyclist (Idea 8482). Personally I have no problems with the example. No one is essentially a cyclist - that isn't what essence is. Two-legged people can be cyclists.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

13953	An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
	Full Idea: For an ostension to be successful it is surely not necessary that I gather what sort of object it is you have indicated, such as being a horse or a zebra. I may even gather which thing you have indicated without knowing that it is a mammal or even alive.
	From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.157)
	A reaction: This nicely articulates the objection I have always felt to Geach's relative identity. 'Oh my God, what the hell is THAT???' is probably going to be a successful act of verbal reference, even while explicitly denying all knowledge of sortals.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument

22100	Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson]
	Full Idea: If duration [experienced time] is what we say, deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different moments in a life-story.
	From: Henri Bergson (Time and Free Will [1889], p.220), quoted by Pete A.Y. Gunter - Bergson p.174
	A reaction: This implies that we are intrinsically unpredictable, and there certainly can't be a regularity account of mental causation. The sense of time is said to make the self radically different from the rest of reality. Bergson later rejected dualism.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').