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13941
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Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
What is it that is susceptible of truth or falsity? The answers suggested constitute a bewildering variety: sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgments, propositions, statements.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
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A reaction:
Carwright's answer is 'statements', which seem to be the same as propositions.
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13944
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We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
We need to distinguish 1) what is asserted, 2) that assertion, 3) asserting something, 4) what is predicated, 5) what is uttered, 6) that utterance, 7) uttering something, 8) the utterance token, and 9) the meaning.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 05-06)
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A reaction:
[summary of his overall analysis in the paper] It is amazingly hard to offer a critical assessment of this sort of analysis, but it gives you a foot in the door for thinking about the issues with increasing clarity.
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13947
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'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
A person who utters 'It's raining' one day does not normally make the same statement as one who utters it the next. But these variations are not accompanied by corresponding changes of meaning. The words 'It's raining' retain the same meaning throughout.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 10)
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A reaction:
This is important, because it shows that a proposition is not just the mental shadow behind a sentence, or a mental shadow awaiting a sentence. Unlike a sentence, a proposition can (and possibly must) include its own context. Very interesting!
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13946
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To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
In order to assert that p it is not necessary to utter exactly those words. ...Clearly, also, in order to assert that p, it is not sufficient to utter the words that were actually uttered.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 07)
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A reaction:
I take the first point to be completely obvious (you can assert one thing with various wordings), and the second seems right after a little thought (the words could be vague, ambiguous, inaccurate, contextual)
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13951
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Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
Whereas what is asserted can be said to be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded, overdrawn, probable, improbable, plausible, true, or false, none of these can be said of the meaning of a sentence.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 12)
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A reaction:
That fairly firmly kicks into touch the idea that the assertion is the same as the meaning of the sentence.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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8412
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A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
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A reaction:
There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
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8413
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Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
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A reaction:
This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
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8411
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Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
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