Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Rationality' and 'On the Principles of Indiscernibles'

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4 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
     Full Idea: The ancient medical Memorists said that ordinary thinking, inferring, reflecting, believing, assuming, examining, generalising and knowing can all be done simply on the basis of memory.
     From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Inference')
     A reaction: The think there is a plausible theory that all neurons do is remember, and are mainly distinguished by the duration of their memories. We might explain these modes of thinking in terms of various combinations of the fast and the slow.
Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Stoics say memory proper involves reflection and assent. Animal memory, by contrast, is not memory proper, but mere perceptual recognition. The horse remembers the road when he is on it, but not when he is in the stable.
     From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Other')
     A reaction: An interesting distinction. Do I remember something if I can never recall it, and yet recognise it when it reappears, such as a person I knew long ago? 'Memory' is ambiguous, between lodged in the mind, and recallable. Unfair to horses, this.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There must be more in the concept of a thing which exists than in that of one which does not exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Principles of Indiscernibles [1696], p.134)