4 ideas
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A, then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1 | |
| A reaction: This is the first proposal to give a possible worlds semantics for conditional statements. Edgington observes that worlds which are nearby for me may not be nearby for you. |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: A possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1 | |
| A reaction: Sounds neat and persuasive. What is the ontological analogue of a stock of hopes? Heaven! |
| 20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
| Full Idea: How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them? | |
| From: Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70) | |
| A reaction: The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |