11 ideas
| 12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There are three common accounts of amusement: superiority theories (Hobbes's 'sudden glory'), 'relief from restraint' (Freud on jokes), and 'incongruity' theories (Schopenhauer). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §5) | |
| A reaction: All three contain some truth. But one need not feel superior to laugh, and one may already be in a state of unrestraint. Schopenhauer seems closest to a good general account. |
| 12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There are amusing buildings, but not amusing rocks and cliffs. If I were to propose a candidate for the formal object of amusement, then the human would be my choice, ...or at least emphasise its centrality. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §9) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. Animal behaviour only seems to amuse if it evokes something human. Plants would have to look a bit human to be funny. |
| 12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Man is the only animal that laughs, so a starting point for all enquiries into laughter must be the hypothesis that it is an attribute of reason (though that gets us no further than our definition of reason). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §1) | |
| A reaction: I would be inclined to say that both our capacity for reason and our capacity for laughter (and, indeed, our capacity for language) are a consequence of our evolved capacity for meta-thought. |
| 12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is a matter of indifference whether the object of amusement be thought to be real. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §7) | |
| A reaction: Sort of. If I say 'wouldn't it be funny if someone did x?', it is probably much less funny than if I say 'apparently he really did x'. The fantasy case has to be much funnier to evoke the laughter. |
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I suggest that Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis, as not primarily a quest for definitions, but as a quest for truth-makers. | |
| From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand') | |
| A reaction: This is not a dichotomy, I think, but a shift of emphasis. A definition will probably refer to truthmakers; a decent account of truthmakers would approximate a definition. |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Predications seem, for the most part, to be true not because of whether things are, but because of how things are. | |
| From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand') | |
| A reaction: This simple point shows that you get into a tangle if you insist that truthmakers just consist of what exists. Lewis says Armstrong offers states of affairs as truthmakers for predications. |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly. | |
| From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth') | |
| A reaction: [His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case. |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Presentism says that although there is nothing outside the present, yet there are past-tensed and future-tensed truths that do not supervene on the present, and hence do not supervene on being. | |
| From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], p.207) | |
| A reaction: Since I rather like both presentism and truth supervening on being, this observation comes as rather a devastating blow. I thought philosophy would be quite easy, but it's turning out to be rather tricky. Could tensed truths supervene on the present? |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: To me it is mysterious how a state of affairs is made out of its particular and universal constituents. Different states of affairs may have the very same constituents, and the existence of constituents by no means entails the existence of the states. | |
| From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'What is there') | |
| A reaction: He is rejecting the structure of states of affairs as wholes made of parts. But then mereology was never going to explain the structure of the world. |
| 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12) | |
| A reaction: Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |