21 ideas
343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
Full Idea: The unexamined life is not worth living for men. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 38a | |
A reaction: I wonder why? I can see Nietzsche offering aristocratic heroes and dancers as counterexamples. Compare Idea 3798. |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
Full Idea: In conjunction with Extensionality, Pairing entails that given a single non-set, infinitely many sets exist. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 04) |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Meinongian abstraction principles say that for any (suitably restricted) class of properties, there exists an abstract entity (arbitrary object, subsistent entity) that possesses just those properties. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 04) | |
A reaction: This is 'Meinongian' because there will be an object which is circular and square. The nub of the idea presumably resides in what is meant by 'restricted'. An object possessing every conceivable property is, I guess, a step too far. |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
Full Idea: If P is metaphysically necessary, then it is absolutely necessary, and necessary in every real (non-epistemic) sense; and if P is possible in any sense, then it's possible in the metaphysical sense. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 02) | |
A reaction: Rosen's shot at defining metaphysical necessity and possibility, and it looks pretty good to me. In my terms (drawing from Kit Fine) it is what is necessitated or permitted 'by everything'. So if it is necessitated by logic or nature, that's included. |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
Full Idea: 'Metaphysical' modality is the sort of modality relative to which it is an interesting question whether the laws of nature are necessary or contingent. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 02) | |
A reaction: Being an essentialist here, I take it that the stuff of the universe necessitates the so-called 'laws'. The metaphysically interesting question is whether the stuff might have been different. Search me! A nice test of metaphysical modality though. |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It may be metaphysically necessary in one sense that sets or universals or mereological aggregates exist, while in another sense existence is always a contingent matter. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10) | |
A reaction: This idea depends on Idea 18856 and 18857. Personally I only think mereological aggregates and sets exist when people decide that they exist, so I don't see how they could ever be necessary. I'm unconvinced about his two concepts. |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
Full Idea: According to the Standard Conception of Metaphysical Necessity, P is metaphysically necessary when it holds in every possible world in which the laws of metaphysics (about the form or structure of the actual world) hold | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10) | |
A reaction: Rosen has a second meaning, in Idea 18856. He thinks it is crucial to see that there are two senses, because many things come out as metaphysically necessary on one concept, but contingent on the other. Interesting.... |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
Full Idea: According to the Non-Standard conception of Metaphysical Necessity, P is metaphysically necessary when its negation is logically incompatible with the nature of things. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10) | |
A reaction: Rosen's new second meaning of the term. My immediate problem is with it resting on being 'logically' incompatible. Are squares 'logically' incompatible with circles? I like the idea that it rests on 'the nature of things'. (Psst! natures = essences) |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It is one thing to say that P is necessary in some generic sense because it is a truth of logic (true in all models of a language, perhaps). It is something else to say that P therefore enjoys a special sort of necessity. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 02) | |
A reaction: This encourages my thought that there is only one sort of necessity (what must be), and the variety comes from the different types of necessity makers (everything there could be, nature, duties, promises, logics, concepts...). |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Combinatorial theories of possibility take it for granted ....that possible worlds in general share a syntax, as it were, differing only in the constituents from which they are generated, or in the particular manner of their arrangements. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 08) | |
A reaction: For instance, it might assume that every world has 'objects', to which 'properties' and 'relations' can be attached, or to which 'functions' can apply. |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
Full Idea: To a first approximation, P is correctly conceivable iff it would be conceivable for a logically ominiscient being who was fully informed about the nature of things. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 05) | |
A reaction: Isn't the last bit covered by 'ominiscient'? Ah, I think the 'logically' only means they have a perfect grasp of what is consistent. This is to meet the standard problem, of ill-informed people 'conceiving' of things which are actually impossible. |
344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
Full Idea: If death is like a night of dreamless sleep it is an advantage, for such nights are very pleasant, and eternity would seem like a single night. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 40d | |
A reaction: Dreamless sleep is only pleasant if being awake is unpleasant. Very quiet days are only pleasant if the active days are horrible. A desire for a totally quiet life is absurd. |
339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
Full Idea: No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 29a | |
A reaction: As a neutral observer, I see little sign of it being a blessing, except as a relief from misery. It seem wrong to view such a natural thing as evil, but it is the thing most of us least desire. |
2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
Full Idea: One should never return an injustice nor harm another human being no matter what one suffers at their hands. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49c | |
A reaction: Jesus of Nazareth was not the first person to make this suggestion. |
345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
Full Idea: A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 41d |
346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
Full Idea: One ought not to return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 49b | |
A reaction: The same as the essential moral teachings of Jesus (see Idea 6288) and Lao Tzu (Idea 6324). The big target is not to be corrupted by the evil of other people. |
341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
Full Idea: Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men. | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - The Apology 30b |
347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
Full Idea: Do I intend to destroy the laws, because the state wronged me by passing a faulty judgement at my trial? | |
From: Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Crito 50c |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
Full Idea: According to the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of the laws of nature, a generalisation is a law just in case it is a theorem of every true account of the actual world that achieves the best overall balance of simplicity and strength. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 08) | |
A reaction: The obvious objection is that many of the theorems will be utterly trivial, and that is one thing that the laws of nature are not. Unless you are including 'metaphysical laws' about very very fundamental things, like objects, properties, relations. |
338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates denies the gods, because he says the sun is stone and the moon is earth. | |
From: report of Socrates (reports of last days [c.399 BCE]) by Plato - The Apology 26d |
7607 | Nagarjuna and others pronounced the world of experience to be an illusion [Nagarjuna, by Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: Many later Buddhists (after Nagarjuna, c.120 CE) developed a belief that everything we experience is an illusion: in the West we would call them idealists. | |
From: report of Nagarjuna (teachings [c.120]) by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is just one step beyond Plato (who at least hung onto the immediate world as an inferior reality), and is presumably intended to motivate meditators to break out of the misery of existence into a higher realm. Personally I am against it. |