34 ideas
20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: A 'necessary' condition for something's being an X is condition that all Xs must satisfy. ...A 'sufficient' condition for something's being an X is a condition that, when satisfied, guarantees that what satisfies it is an X. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1) | |
A reaction: By summarising this I arrive at the requirement/guarantee formulation, which I am rather pleased with. What is required for rain, and what guarantees rain? |
20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: If we specify the 'necessary' conditions that are 'sufficient' for something's being an X, that is a combination of conditions such that all and only Xs meet them, which is the hallmark of a definition of X-hood. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1) | |
A reaction: There are, of course, many other ways to define something, as shown in the 2.D Reason | Definition section of this database. This nicely summarises the classical view. |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the feminist critique, ideologies that operate as tools of political repression are falsely represented as definitions possessing a timeless, natural, asocial, universal objectivity. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I suppose this does not just apply to definitions, but to all expressions of ideologically repressive strategy. I'm trying to think of an example of a specifically feminist problem case. Davies doesn't cite anyone. |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Free logics say 1) singular terms are allowed that do not designate anything that exists; sometimes 2) is added: the domain of discourse is allowed to be empty. Logics with both conditions are called 'universally free logics'. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I really like the sound of this, and aim to investigate it. Karel Lambert's writings are the starting point. Maybe the domain of logic is our concepts, rather than things in the world, in which case free logic sounds fine. |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Under its now standard principal interpretation, the monadic predicate variables in second-order logic range over subsets of the domain on individuals. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is an interpretation in which properties are just sets of things, which is fine if you are a logician, but not if you want to talk about anything important. Still, we must play the game. Boolos introduced plural quantification at this point. |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Ontological quantifiers might just as well range over all the entities needed for the semantics. ...The minimal way would be to just stop calling '∃' an 'existential quantifier', and always read it as 'there is...' rather than 'there exists...'. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: There is no right answer here, but it seems to be the strategy adopted by most logicians, and the majority of modern metaphysicians. They just allow abstracta, and even fictions, to 'exist', while not being fussy what it means. Big mistake! |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: A cursory examination shows that mathematicians have no aversion to saying that this-or-that mathematical entity exists. But is this a different sense of 'existence'? | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: For those of us like me and my pal Quine who say that 'exist' is univocal (i.e. only one meaning), this is a nice challenge. Quine solves it by saying maths concerns sets of objects. I, who don't like sets, am puzzled (so I turn to fictionalism...). |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: There are sensible ways to maike a distinction between different kinds of being. ..One need not fear that this leads to a 'bloated ontology'. ...We need only distinguish 'ontological commitment' from 'existential commitment' | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: He speaks of giving fictional and abstract entities a 'lower score' in existence. I think he means the 'ontological' commitment to be the stronger of the two. |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: The paradox of negative existentials says that if 's' does not designate something, then the sentence 's is non-existent' is untrue. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This only seems be a problem for logicians. Everyone else can happily say 'my coffee is non-existent'. |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Parmenides was correct - one cannot speak of that which is not, even to say that it is not. But one can speak of concepts and say of them that they do not correspond to anything real. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [This summarises Alonso Church, who was developing Frege] This sounds like the right thing to say about non-existence, but then the same principle must apply to assertions of existence, which will also be about concepts and not things. |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: The medieval philosophers and then Leibniz were keen on finding 'principles of individuation', and the idea appears again in Frege, to be taken up in some respects by Wittgenstein. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I take a rather empirical approach to this supposed problem, and suggest we break 'individuation' down into its component parts, and then just drop the word. Discussions of principles of individuations strike me as muddled. Wiggins and Lowe today. |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: In the Identity of Indiscernibles, one speaks about properties, and the notion of a property is by no means clearly fixed and formalized in modern symbolic logic. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
A reaction: The unclarity of 'property' is a bee in my philosophical bonnet, in speech, and in metaphysics, as well as in logic. It may well be the central problem in our attempts to understand the world in general terms. He cites intensional logic as promising. |
20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: It was suggested that aesthetic experience isn't solely perceptual. It's infused by a cognitive but non-conceptual process described by Kant as involving the free play of the imagination and the understanding. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This fits literature very well, painting quite well, and music hardly at all. |
20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: To explain why not everyone who is prepared to encounter a thing's aesthetic properties can recognise them, ...eighteenth century theorists posited the existence of a special faculty of aesthetic perception, that of taste. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: But there seem to be two aspects to taste - first the capacity to enjoy some sorts of art, and second the ability to discriminate the good from the bad. The latter is 'standards' of taste (Hume's title). Do non-musical people lack taste? |
20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: An example of the sublime is the vastness of the night sky. ...It includes negative feelings of insignificance in the face of nature's indifference, power and magnitude, but is positive in that we are capable of comprehending such matters. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The negative part seems to be a very intellectual experience, with close links to religion, and may be the experience that leads to deism (belief in God's indifference). |
20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The first to link the art forms together explicitly and to separate them from other disciplines and activities were the authors of encyclopedias and books in the 1740s and 1750s. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Intriguing that no individual seems to get the credit (or blame). Presumably our modern Aesthetics (applied to art) couldn't exist before this move was made - and yet there is plenty of aesthetic discussion in early Greek philosophy. |
20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The avant-garde art of the twentieth century played a significant role in defeating definitions that had prevailed in earlier times, such as ones maintaining that art is representation, expression or significant form | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I really think the first rule of philosophical aesthetics is 'ignore Marcel Duchamp'. We wouldn't give up our idea of philosophy if someone managed to publish a long string of expletives in a philosophy journal. Would we?? |
20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: 'Aesthetic functionalism' maintains that something is an artwork if it is intended to provide the person who contemplates it for its own sake with an aesthetic experience of a significant magnitude on the basis of its aesthetic features. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [Beardsley is cited as having this view] For this you need to know what an aesthetic 'feature' is, and you'd have to indepdently recognise aesthetic experience. |
20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: One view explains music's expressiveness as 'associative'. Through being regularly associated with emotionally charged words or events, particular musical ideas become associated with emotions or moods. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is a more promising theory. I take the feeling in music to be parasitic on other feelings we have, and other triggers that evoke them. I'm particularly struck with story-telling (which Levinson and Robinson also like). |
20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'expression theory' holds that if music is sad that is because it expresses the composer's sadness, ...but composers take a long time composing sad works, and may even been gleeful at receiving payment for it. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Pretty conclusive. I see composing as like acting. Just as you can put on a happy or sad face, so a composer can discover music that feels sad or happy. Three movement sonatas don't fit expression at all. |
20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'institutional' theory says to be an artwork, an artwork must be appropriately placed within a web of practices, roles and frameworks that comprise an informally organised institution, the artworld. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites George Dickie] This theory seems to entirely developed to cope with the defiant gesture of Marcel Duchamp. Once I am an established artist, I have the authority to label anything I like as a work of art. Silly. |
20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Mendelssohn said that what music expresses is not too indefinite to put into words but, on the contrary, it is too definite. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Not sure whether that is true, but it is a lovely remark. It certainly challenges the naive philosophical view that words are the most precise mode of expression. |
20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The title as given by the artist is something we might need to know (Brueghel's 'Icarus', for example), ...and if a painting depicts one of two twins, it will be the artist's intention that settles which one it is. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Those two points strike me as conclusively in favour of the importance of an artist's perceived intentions. |
20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Learning that a work is a copy of an earlier work, or is done in the style of some other artist, is relevant to an evaluation of what its creator has achieved. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 3.6) | |
A reaction: A simple but powerful point. We evaluate a forgery as an achievement, and the original plate of a great print as the focus of the achievement. We can assess the achievement of a poem in any printed copy. But what about perfect painting replicas? |
20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: 'Actual intentionalism' holds that work's meaning is what its author intended, ...while 'moderate actual intentionalism' allows that the author's intention determines the work's meaning only if that intention is carried through successfully. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Noel Carroll for the moderate version] D.H. Lawrence, probably with a dose of Freud, said 'trust the work, not the artist' (of Moby Dick, I think). The thought is that authors only half know intentions, and works reveal them. |
20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the 'hypothetical intentionalist', the work's meaning is determined by the intentions the audience is best justified in attributing to the author, whether or not these are the ones the author actually had. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 5.4) | |
A reaction: [Nehamas, Levinson and Jenefer Robinson are cited] This opens the door for psychiatric interpretations of 'Hamlet', and so on. The experts disagree over the nature of the audience needed to do the job. |
20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: If we could duplicate 'Mona Lisa', we're likely to be concerned to track the original and keep it separate from its clones, even if we judge that the clone isn't inferior to the original when the goal is art appreciation. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 4.3) | |
A reaction: But why? Is it just a sentimental attachment to what Leonardo worked on? Does the original manuscript of a work of literature have the same importance? We treasure such things, but not for aesthetic reasons. |
20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Some multiply instanced artworks, such as novel and poems, must have at least one instance. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is a comment on the idea that all artworks, even oil paintings and buildings are potentially multiply instanced (so the work is the type - Wollheim's view, not one of the tokens). |
20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The 'arousal' theory says music is sad because it moves the hearer to sadness, ...but this seems to get things back to front, because we normally think it is because the music is sad that it moves the listener to sadness. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The objection is right. If Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' always makes me feel sad (because it is so hopelessly optimistic), then that makes the music sad. Is the theory saying that there are no feelings in the music? |
22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Immorality in art is sometimes an artistic defect and sometimes not. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: Davies seems to avoid the 'immoralist' view, that immorality in a work of art can sometimes be a strength. A sharp distinction is needed, I think, between the morality of what is depicted, and the morality of the whole artwork. |
22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: One case when the depiction of immorality becomes an artistic flaw …is when it is presented in brutal detail in a way that glorifies it. The celebration of evil corrodes the work's artistic value. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't allow for the case where the evil is celebrated in one part of a novel, yet the novel as a whole does not endorse the evil. The Marquis de Sade seems to have fully celebrated what we take to be evil. |
22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: The positive moral stance of a story can be an artistic defect where it shapes the story in an inappropriate fashion. If it displays disproportionate moral outrage, …it reveals a lack of toleration, compassion, or insight into its subject-matter. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: There could be narrative irony in a story told by an angry and puritanical person, which continually condemns wickedness, with the reader expected to have a more tolerant attitude. Hard to think of any examples of this problem. |
22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: A work that looks for the audience's sympathetic approval and alienates them instead, because it's both morally repulsive and incoherent in what it requires them to suppose, isn't an artistic success. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 8.7) | |
A reaction: The implication seems to be that works are only successful if they achieve what the creator consciously intended. Lawrence said trust the novel, not the novelist. Milton's Satan is a famous example of heroism not intended by the author. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |