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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds' and 'Scientific Thought'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
5831 The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14759 A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
     Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration')
     A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together.
11842 If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
     Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
     A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5826 The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II)
     A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
8160 The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1
     A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist.
14609 We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
     Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
     A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22933 We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
     Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
     A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.