4 ideas
19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13) | |
A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it. |
19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The governing fiction of possible worlds theory says that whenever something is possible, there is a world where it happens. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 05) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the only sensible attitude to possible worlds I can think of. |
7765 | The use of a sentence is its commitments and entitlements [Brandom, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Brandom develops a particular conception of 'use', according to which a sentence's use is the set of commitments and entitlements associated with public utterance of that sentence. | |
From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Articulating Reasons: Intro to Inferentialism [2000]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.6 | |
A reaction: It immediately strikes me that a sentence could only have commitments and entitlements if it already had a meaning. However, the case of money shows how there might be nothing more to a thing's significance than its entitlements. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |