87 ideas
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every account is either a definition or a demonstration. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a24) | |
A reaction: That is, it is either a summary of the thing's essential nature, or it is a proof of some natural fact, starting from first principles. |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One member of a pair of contraries is sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411a02) | |
A reaction: This obviously requires prior knowledge of what the opposite is. He says you can infer the crooked from the straight. You can hardly use light in isolation to infer dark [see DA 418b17]. What's the opposite of a pig? |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Number we perceive by the denial of continuity. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425a19) | |
A reaction: This is a key thought. A being (call it 'Parmenides') which sees all Being as One would make no distinctions of identity, and so could not count anything. Why would they want numbers? |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order … - for example, the triangle in the quadrilateral, or the nutritive part of animate things in the perceptual part. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 414a28) | |
A reaction: 'Prior' seems to be a value for Aristotle, which is never present in modern discussions of ontological relations and structure. Priority tracks back to first principles. |
15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: All organisms form categories: even mealworms have category-based preferences, and higher-order animals such as pigeons or octopi can display quite sophisticated categorical judgements. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: [She cites some 1980 research to support this] This comes as no surprise, as I take categorisation as almost definitive of what a mind is. My surmise is that some sort of 'labelling' system is at the heart of it (like Googlemail labels!). |
15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: By five children assume that a variety of categories have rich inductive potential, are stable over outward transformations, include crucial nonobvious properties, have innate potential, privilege causal features, can be explained causally, and are real. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This is Gelman's helpful summary of the findings of research on childhood essentialising, and says the case for this phenomenon is 'compelling'. |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the eye were an animal, sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed it is no longer an eye,except in name. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b18) | |
A reaction: This is a drastic view of form as merely function, which occasionally appears in Aristotle. To say a blind eye is not an eye is a tricky move in metaphysics. So what is it? In some sense it is still an eye. |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The cause of its being for everything is its substance. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b12) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if 'substance' here means essence. We no longer see the cause of something's being as intrinsic to the thing. Only previous causes produce things. The 'form' must be the intrinsic cause of being. |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Matter is potentiality, whereas form is actuality. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a09) | |
A reaction: Plato said mud has no Form. What did Aristotle think of that? I only ask because to me mud looks like unformed actuality. |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For a dialectician anger is a desire for retaliation or something like that, where for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hoot stuff around the heart. The scientist gives the matter, where the dialectician give the form and the account. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a30) | |
A reaction: A nice illumination of hylomorphism. Notice that the dialectician also give the account [logos]. |
15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The notion of caste in India is more essentialized among upper-caste than lower-caste individuals. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: In a book defending fairly innate essentialism in the human race, Gelman offers this point as a warning that large cultural ingredients can be involved. Racism is the classic difficulty with essentialism. |
15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The two views contrasting with essentialism naturally emerging in childhood are the claim that essentialism is a historical accident emerging from Western philosophy, and that essentialism is an inherent consequence of naming things. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Background') | |
A reaction: Helpful. I take Idea 15682 to rule out the idea that it is just a feature of western culture. I can't conceive of early man surviving without essentialism. I don't think it rules out the naming view. Animals may do what emerges in us as full 'naming'. |
15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children incorporate a variety of nonobvious features into their concepts, including internal parts, functions, causes, and ontological distinctions. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: This remark sums up the general thesis of her book, which she supports with a wealth of first-hand evidence. It supports my view, that the desire and need for explanation is at the root of essentialist concepts. It's hard wired in us. |
15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We map types of essentialism by asking is it in the world or in our representations, is it sortal or causal or ideal, and is it specific particulars or placeholders for the unknown? | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I am struck by the way that this practising experimental psychologist gets to ask questions and make distinctions much more extensively than most armchair philosophers on the subject. She focuses on the representational, causal, placeholder view. |
15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Intro') | |
A reaction: I think the introduction of categories here is a misunderstanding. Does an uncategorisable thing therefore have no identity (even though it has properties)? If categories give objects their identity, what gives categories their identity? |
15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
Full Idea: I suggest that sortals are likewise required for determining essence. One cannot answer the question 'What is the essence of this?' without supplying the sortal - of this 'what'. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I remain baffled by this view. I take the category to be an inductive generalisation from other similar individuals. It can't get off the ground if you don't start with the individuals. Sortals are just a shorthand. |
15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: With kind essentialism the person assumes that the world is divided up into preexisting natural categories. Individual essentialism seems not to require any such commitment to kind realism. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my difficulty: how do we decide whether some category or attributed essence is part of a preexisting natural kind? Some natural kinds are self-evident, like water (roughly), but others need subtle teasing out. How is the teasing done? |
15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Kinship is essentialized, but admits of degrees, ...and people can be essentialist even about categories they do not view as fixed over time, such as age groupings. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 03 'Summary') | |
A reaction: Given my notion of essence are necessarily explanatory, I embrace both of these points. Being very athletic comes in degrees, and changes over times. |
15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism has its source in the cognitive requirement of categorization in certain domains - particularly as they affect the young learner. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Essentialist') | |
A reaction: I think the phenomenon is better understood as part of the cognitive requirement to understand and explain. Categorisation is just one way to aid explanation. Children try to understand (essentially) a new animal without categorisation. |
15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children. ...Mothers teach children about kinds, not about essences, and mothers help children identify which categories are richly structured. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 07 'Conclusions') | |
A reaction: This is a psychologist who specialises in this topic. If you think essentialism is inculcated by a our culture, you will have to blame the fathers. |
15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is a reasoning heuristic that allows us to make fairly good predictions much of the time, but it should not be confused with the structure of reality. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Discussion') | |
A reaction: She particularly cites biology as the area where it might be inaccurate. I'm beginning to think that the operations of induction are the place to look for an good understanding of essentialism. |
15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is. ...An object looking like a knife is less likely to be called 'a knife' if it is described as having been created by accident. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: I like this because it talks, suggestively, of 'historical paths' rather than of 'origin'. Thus we might judge a person's identity by their traumatic experience rather than by their birth. This doesn't challenge necessity of origin, but affects labels. |
15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The modes of understanding (or modes of construal) which have been proposed are intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist (perhaps), and deontological. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: She cites psychological research to support this, and calls it 'a relatively small number' of modes. Compare Aristotle's four modes of cause/explanation. |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The intellect is in a way potentially the object of thought, but nothing in actuality before it thinks, and the potentiality is like that of the tablet on which there is nothing actually written. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 429b31) | |
A reaction: This passage is referred to by Leibniz, and is the origin of the concept of the 'tabula rasa'. Aristotle need not be denying innate ideas, but merely describing the phenomenology of the moment before a train of thought begins. |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perception of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428b19) | |
A reaction: This is, surprisingly, the view which was raised and largely rejected in 'Theaetetus'. It became a doctrine of Epicureanism, and seems to make Aristotle a thoroughgoing empiricist, though that is not so clear elsewhere. I think Aristotle is right. |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Where there is perception there is also pleasure and pain, and where there are these, of necessity also appetite. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413b23) |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
Full Idea: Aristotle famously holds that in perception our minds take on the form of what is being perceived. | |
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 08.2 | |
A reaction: [References in Aristotle needed here...] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ. To suppose that it is requires the supposition that on contact with the object the sense-organ itself discerns what is doing the discerning. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 426b16) |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Why is there not also a sense of the senses themselves? And why don't the senses produce sensation without external bodies, since they contain elements? | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417a03) |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A possible line of inquiry would be into the question for what purpose we have many senses and not just one. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425b04) |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Common sense-objects are movement, rest, number, shape and size, which are not special to any one sense, but common to all. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a18) |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Now I call that sense-object 'special' that does not admit of being perceived by another sense and about which it is impossible to be deceived. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a15) |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the thinking soul, images play the part of percepts, and the assertion or negation of good or bad is invariably accompanied by avoidance or pursuit, which is the reason for the soul's never thinking without an image. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a15) |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perception is of particular things, but knowledge is of universals, which are in a way in the soul itself. Thus a man may think whenever he wishes, but not perceive. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417b22) |
15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Memory is notorious for conforming to theory (rather than memory being a neutral source of information). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This observation by a psychologist is music to sceptics about objectivity. Memory is so fundamental to our basic epistemology that it could even be the nature of thought itself. |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Demonstrations are both from a starting-point and have a sort of end, namely the deduction or the conclusion. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a25) | |
A reaction: A starting point has to be a first principle [arché]. It has been observed that Aristotle explains demonstration very carefully, but rarely does it in his writings. |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In demonstration a definition of the essence is required as starting point, so that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously be dialectical and futile. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b25) | |
A reaction: Interesting to see 'dialectical' used as a term of abuse! Illuminating. For scientific essentialism, then, demonstration is filling out the whole story once the essence has been inferred. It is circular, because essence is inferred from accidents. |
15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Inductive success is rewarded with more induction. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: I love this one. Neat, accurate, and central to how we understand the world. I take inductive success to be stored as labels, concepts, categories, words and general truths, which are then our resource for further attempts. |
15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Because of their narrow focus, children's sensitivity to categories as the basis of induction is a reasoning bias that, though useful much of the time, results in systematic errors. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This is the bad sense of 'essentialism' which worries its opponents. Presumably, though, my favoured scientific essentialism will be 'scientific', and avoid this problem. The relation between categories and induction needs to be clear. |
15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We suggest that children overestimate the power of a single example. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This conclusion arises from extensive psychological research. 'My grandma smoked, and she lived to be 97' - adults do this too. Wittgenstein says assuming other minds because of your own is induction from one example! |
15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People tend to be satisfied with rather shallow explanations. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: She cites some psychological research to support this. Pretty obvious really. I take the so-called 'scientific method' to be nothing more than ceasing to be satisfied with such shallowness. |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b18) | |
A reaction: Although Aristotle was cautious about this, he clearly endorses here the idea that essences play an explanatory role in geometry. The caution is in the word 'useful', rather than 'vital'. How else can we arrive at this result, though? |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The soul seems to be universally defined by three features, so to speak, the production of movement, perception and incorporeality. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 405b12) | |
A reaction: 'Incorporeality' begs the question, but its appearance is a phenomenon that needs explaining. 'Movement' is an interesting Greek view. Nowadays we would presumably added intentional states, and the contents and meaning of thoughts. No 'reason'? |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: On the later views inspired by Aristotle's 'De Anima' there was no longer just one soul, but several, and each of them had a great deal in common with the body. | |
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.17 | |
A reaction: Is this based on the faculties of sophia, episteme, nous, techne and phronesis, or is it based on the vegetative, appetitive and rational parts? The latter, I presume. Not so interesting, not so modular. |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Three ways have been handed down in which people define the soul: what is most capable of moving things, since it moves itself; or a body which is the most fine-grained and least corporeal; or that it is composed of the elements. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 409b19) | |
A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle beginning an investigation by idenfying the main explanations which have been 'handed down' from previous generations. These three aren't really in competition, and might all be true. |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Soul is substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a20) | |
A reaction: To understand what Aristotle means by 'form' you must, I'm afraid, read the 'Metaphysics'. Form isn't shape, but rather the essence which bestows the individual identity on the thing. 'Psuche is the essence of man' might be a better slogan. |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The soul is the cause [aitia] of its body alike in three senses which we explicitly recognise. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, and it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b09) | |
A reaction: 'Aitia' also means explanation, so these are three ways to explain a human being, by what it does, why what it is for, and by what it intrinsically is. Activity, purpose and nature. |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: How could a spatial understanding understand anything? Wiil it do so with parts, seen as magnitudes or as points? If it is points, the understanding will never get through them all. If magnitudes, it will understand things an unlimited number of times. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a09) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a strong commitment to the idea that the mind is not physical because it is necessarily non-spatial. |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the soul is composed of parts of the body, or the harmony of the elements composing the body, there will be many souls, and everywhere in the body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a15) | |
A reaction: We will ignore "everywhere in the body", but the rest seems to me exactly right. The idea of the unity of the soul is an understandable and convenient assumption, but it leads to all sorts of confusion. A crowd remains unified if half its members leave. |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What is it that holds the soul together, if it by nature has parts? For surely it cannot be the body. For it seems on the contrary that it is rather the soul that holds the body together? | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b05) | |
A reaction: This is the hylomorphic view of a human, that the soul is the form that give unity to the matter. To do the job, presumably the form or soul need an intrinsic unity of its own, and hence cannot have parts. Apart from the need for unifying glue. |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If soul has parts, what holds them together? Not body, because that is united by soul. If a thing unifies the soul, then THAT is the soul (unless it too has parts, which would lead to an infinite regress). Best to say the soul is a unity. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b10) | |
A reaction: You don't need a 'thing' to unify something (like a crowd). I say the body holds the soul together, not physically, but because the body's value permeates thought. The body is the focused interest of the soul, like parents kept together by their child. |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The soul is in a way all the things that exist, for all the things that exist are objects either of perception or of thought. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431b20) | |
A reaction: Sounds very like Berkeley's empirical version of idealism. It also seems to imply modern externalist (anti-individualist) understandings of the mind (which strike me as false). |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For those who divide the soul into parts, and divide and separate them in accord with their capacities, the parts turn out to be very many. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a32) | |
A reaction: I accept the warning. The capacities which interest me are those which seem to generate our basic ontology, but if the capacities become fine-grained, they are legion. |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If an animal has a desiring part, it is capable of moving itself. A desiring part, however, cannot exist without an imagination, and all imagination is either rationally calculative or perceptual. Hence in the latter the other animals also have a share. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433b27) | |
A reaction: Maybe if you asked people whether other animals are imaginative they would say no, but this argument is strong support for the positive view. |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Most affections (like anger) seem to involve the body, but thinking seems distinctive of the soul. But if this requires imagination, it too involves the body. Only pure mental activity would prove the separation of the two. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a08-) | |
A reaction: What an observant man! Modern neuroscience is bringing out the fact that emotion is central to all mental life. We can't recognise faces without it. I say imagination is essential to pure reason, and that seems emotional too. Reason is physical. |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That the soul is not separable from the body - or that certain parts of it are not, if it naturally has parts - is quite clear. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413a04) | |
A reaction: This doesn't make him a physicalist. I've seen him described in modern terms as a functionalist, but that makes the mind abstract and the body concrete. Perhaps he is an 'Integrationist' (as Descartes might be in his 'pilot' passage). |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The affections of the soul - spiritedness, fear, pity, confidence, joy, loving, hating - would all seem to involve the body, since at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a16) | |
A reaction: Aristotle was not a physicalist, but this resembles the pilot-in-the-ship passage in Descartes, accepting the very close links. |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the soul is something distinct from the mixture, why then are the being for flesh and for the other parts of the animal destroyed at the same time? | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a25) | |
A reaction: An obvious response to this reasonable question is to say that we see the body die, but not the soul, so the soul doesn't die. The problem is then to find some evidence for the soul's continued existence. |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is another absurdity which follows, …since they attach the soul to a body, and place it in the body, without further determining the cause due to which this attachment comes about. …Yet this seems necessary, because this association produces action. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407b14) | |
A reaction: A clear statement of the interaction objection to full substance dualism. Critics say that dualists have to invoke a 'miracle' at this point. |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Early thinkers try only to describe the soul, but they fail to go into any kind of detail about the body which is to receive the soul, as if it were possible (as it is in the Pythagorean tales) for just any old soul to be clothed in just any old body. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407b20) | |
A reaction: Precisely. Anyone who seriously believes that a human mind can be reincarnated in a flea needs their mind examined. Actually they need their brain examined, but that probably wouldn't impress them. I can, of course, imagine moving into a flea. |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In 'De Anima' Aristotle cannot fit his account of separable reason - which is not the form of a body - into his general theory that the soul is the form of the body. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.33 | |
A reaction: A penetrating observation. Possibly the biggest challenge for a modern physicalist is to give a reductive account of 'pure' reason, in terms of brain events or brain functions. |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perhaps it would be better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does in virtue of the soul. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408b12) | |
A reaction: This can be seen as incipient behaviourism in Aristotle's view. It echoes the functionalist view that what matters is not what the mind is, or is made of, but what it does. |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should not enquire whether the soul and the body are one thing, any more than whether the wax and its imprint are, or in general whether the matter of each thing is one with that of which it is the matter. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b06) | |
A reaction: This is his hylomorphist view of objects, so that the soul is the 'form' which bestows identity (and power) on the matter of which it is made. This remark is thoroughly physicalist. |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Thinking, then, is something other than perceiving, and its two kinds are held to be imagination and supposition. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 427b28) |
15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The three components of essentialism as a folk belief are the idea that certain categories are natural kinds, the idea that some unobservable property causes the way things are, and the idea that words reflect real structures. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle insists [against Plato] that desires, even rational desires, are a capacity distinct from reason, as is perception. Belief is included within reason. And he sometimes distinguishes steps of reasoning from insight. | |
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428-432) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting' | |
A reaction: So the standard picture of desire as permanently in conflict with reason comes from Aristotle. Maybe Plato is right on that one (though he doesn't say much about it). Since objectivity needs knowledge, reason does need belief. |
15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Labels may signal categories that are believed to embody an essence. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 02 'Privileged') | |
A reaction: This is quoted by her, as a summary of a substantial body of research which she endorses. I cite it because it pinpoints my own view. I take 'labels' to be basic to minds, as organisers of thought, and this ties essences to labels. Satisfying picture. |
15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Properties that enter into causally meaningful links are better remembered and are treated as more central to the category than properties that are not causally meaningful. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation2') | |
A reaction: This is a summary of considerable psychological research. This account not only sounds plausible, but would fit better withy why we form concepts and categories in the first place. We are trying to relate to the causations of nature. |
15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
Full Idea: On prototype views, categories are characterized by distance from a prototype. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation') | |
A reaction: Gelman observes that this view makes no reference to any causal features of things. This cuts them off from using underlying essences in the process of categorisation and concept-formation. How do you spot a prototype, with no category? |
15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Theory-based approaches to categories are a response to the limitations of mere similarities holding the category together, and require knowledge-rich explanatory models to say which features are more central to a concept. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation1') | |
A reaction: I see a promising account in linking theory theory to essentialism. For a physical object (or even for a process) infer a structure, and then identify what is most important in that structure. That gives you your stable, agreed concept. |
15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Language does not appear to be necessary for forming categories, since prelinguistic infants acquire many categories, and even use categories to form inferences about unknown properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: She cites lots of research in support of this claim. The idea may come as a surprise to some people, but not to me. I take it that categorisation is what a brain is for, including animal brains. |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Self-controlled people, even when they desire and have an appetite for things, do not do these things for which they have the desire, but instead follow the understanding. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a06) | |
A reaction: If modern discussions would stop talking of 'weakness of will', and talk instead of 'control' and its lack, the whole issue would become clearer. Akrasia is then seen, for example, as an action of the whole person, not of some defective part. |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To experience pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean in relation to good or bad as such. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a10) | |
A reaction: A bizarre view which is interesting, but strikes me as wrong. We are drawn towards pleasure, but judgement can pull us away again, and 'good' is in the judgement, not in the feeling. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nature does nothing in vain. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 434a31) |
15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We can confidently determine the chemical composition of gold from just a single sample, but we cannot determine the height of trees from just a single tree. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: The tricky word here is 'confidently'. If you meet one Latvian who is nice, do you assume they are all nice? At what point do you decide gold etc. really are natural kinds, where one sample tells all? Evolution of species... |
15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children judged personal characteristics as more stable when they were referred to by a noun ('She is a carrot eater') than by a verbal predicate ('She eats carrots whenever she can') | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Naming') | |
A reaction: This fits with my feeling that 'labels' are the basis of how the mind works. The noun invokes a genuine category of thing, where a predicate attaches to some preselected category ('she'). Gelman says names encourage inductions. |
15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism does not entail that people know what the essence is. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This is a fundamental and (I would say) fairly obvious point, but it needs to be made to the more passionate opponents of essentialism. |
15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism encourages a 'scientific' mindset in thinking about the natural world, a belief that intensive study of a natural domain will yield ever more underlying properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Maybe scientists must be committed to essences, the way mathematicians must be committed to numbers? This idea spendidly opposes the doubts expressed by Popper. |
15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
Full Idea: If my speculations are correct, then essentialism starts out strictly as a belief that many categories are richly structured kinds, then additionally becomes a search for underlying inherent properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 10 'Figuring') | |
A reaction: This is her summary of extensive essentialist research among children. She favours the priority of kinds and categories. We actually change taxonomies on the basis of revisions in our accounts of essence. Science negotiates. |
15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |
Full Idea: One major argument against the view that essences are real is the rampant essentializing of categories that are socially constructed (such as race, caste and occupation). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: You can't argue with that. It raises the question of whether the approach of scientific essentialism has any value in the social, rather than physical, sciences. We jokingly essentialise groups of people such as referees or Oxonians. |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There a four sorts of movement - spatial movement, alteration, withering and growth. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 406a12) | |
A reaction: Large parts of Aristotle's writings attempt to explain these four. |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There seem to be two producers of movement, either desire or practical intellect, but practical reason begins in desire. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a16) |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary for what moves things to be itself moving. For a thing can be moving in two ways - with reference to something else, or intrinsically. A ship is moving intrinsically, but sailors move because they are in something that is moving. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 406a03) | |
A reaction: I love the way that Aristotle is desperate to explain the puzzle of movement, yet we just take it for granted. Very illuminating about puzzles. Newton's First Law of Motion. |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every movement being either a push or a pull, there must be a still point as with the circle, and this will be the point of departure for the movement. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433b26) |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What has pushed something else makes the latter push as well. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 435b30) | |
A reaction: Aristotle seems to have spotted that this is intrinsic to massive bodies, and is not just friction etc. Newton adds a vector to Aristotle's insight. |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What has been born must have growth, a prime of life, and a time of withering away. | |
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 434a23) | |
A reaction: Modern biologists don't seem much interested in the 'prime of life', but for Aristotle it is crucial, as the fulfilment of a thing's essential nature. Nietzsche would probably agree with Aristotle on this. We dread seeing one period of life as 'superior'. |