5 ideas
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does. | |
| From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6) |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another. | |
| From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5) |
| 6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The idea that there should be something like a distinction of levels among properties is captured in Ramsey's 'simple theory of types'. | |
| From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell | |
| A reaction: I merely report this, though it is not immediately obvious how anyone would decide which 'level' a type belonged on. |
| 3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: Beliefs are maps by which we steer. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.259 n5 |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |