Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Philosophy of Logics' and 'Two Problems of Epistemology'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack]
     Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does.
     From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6)
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack]
     Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another.
     From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
     Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
     From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
     A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').